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STATE HAZARDOUS WASTE FACILITY SITING: 
EASING THE PROCESS THROUGH LOCAL 
COOPERATION AND PREEMPTION 
Celeste P. Duffy* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The chemical revolution that followed the Second World War 
resulted in the ever-increasing use of chemicals in all aspects of 
American life.l With it came the improper, unregulated disposal2 
of hazardous wastes3 into the air, water, and land. As a result, 
many Americans now face the risk of serious illness or death from 
hazardous waste contamination.4 The contamination threatens to 
* Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1. An Analysis of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, [11 Curro Dev.] ENV'T 
REP. (BNA) 633, 637 (August 22, 1980) [hereinafter cited as An Analysis of RCRA]. 
2. According to EPA studies from 1975 to 1978, 90 percent of the total hazardous waste 
in the United States is disposed of by improper or unsound methods: 48 percent in 
unlined surface impoundments; 30 percent on the land; 10 percent by uncontrolled 
incineration; and 2 percent by other unsound methods. The remaining 10 percent in-
cludes 6 percent controlled incineration, 2 percent secure landfills and 2 percent recov-
ered. OFFICE OF WATER & WASTE MANAGEMENT, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PRoTECTION 
AGENCY, EVERYBODY'S PROBLEM: HAZARDOUS WASTE 15 (1980) (SW-826) [hereinafter 
cited as EVERYBODY'S PROBLEM]. 
Traditionally, decisions about the location of landfills and dumps had been based on 
economic rather than environmental criteria. As a result, many landfills and dumps 
were located in areas such as marshlands, abandoned sand and gravel pits, old strip 
mines, and limestone sinkholes, most of which have hydraulic connections with natural 
waters. Consequently, these waste disposal sites, along with the unlined industrial 
surface impoundments sited without regard for hydrogeological standards, have the 
potential to release their hazardous wastes into the environment. ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION AGENCY, STATE DECISION-MAKERS GUIDE FOR HAZARDOUS WASTE MAN-
AGEMENT 15 (1977) (SW-612) [hereinafter cited as STATE DECISION-MAKERS GUIDE]. 
3. A waste is defined as hazardous if it exhibits either of two effects: 1) the waste can 
cause or significantly contribute to death or serious irreversible or incapacitating illness 
because of its quantity, concentration, or physical, chemical, or infectious characteris-
tics, or 2) the waste poses a substantial or potential danger to human health or the 
environment when mismanaged. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (1976). For a further discussion of the 
definition of hazardous waste under RCRA, see infra text at notes 30-37. 
4. See infra text and notes at notes 48-56. 
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intensify in magnitude if an adequate number of waste disposal 
facilities are not sited to provide regulated disposal of the hazard-
ous wastes generated. 
Between 255 and 275 million metric tons of hazardous wastes 
are generated in the United States annually.s That quantity is 
increasing relative to the yearly growth rate in chemical produc-
tion.6 Generated by industry, hospitals, research laboratories, and 
all levels of government, hazardous wastes are the remnants of a 
highly technological society.7 Industry is the largest source of 
these wastes, manufacturing a host of products from chemicals 
which consumers depend upon and expect in their daily lives.8 
Prior to the public's awareness of the potential dangers of the 
improper disposal of hazardous wastes, the "out of sight out of 
mind"9 perspective left everyone content that no problem existed. 
Then, in the late 1970's, the catastrophies at Love Canal 10 and the 
Valley of the Drumsll alerted the public to the real dangers of 
hazardous waste pollution. The magnitude of the damage at both 
locations left such an impact upon the public that Love Canal and 
Valley of the Drums became household words. 
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has now iden-
tified hundreds of dumpsites as having damaged health and the 
environment.12 1t also has listed two thousand others as potential 
threats.13 The threats are so serious that the public now finally 
5. N.Y. Times, March 16, 1983, at B14, col. 1. 
6. The yearly growth rate in chemical production is estimated at 7.6 percent. Stafford, 
Why Superfund Was Needed, 7 EPA JOURNAL 9 (June, 1981 reprint). 
7. EVERYBODY'S PROBLEM, supra note 2, at 12. 
8. [d. 
9. An Analysis of RCRA, supra note 1, at 637. 
10. About 80 chemicals, including many which are suspected carcinogens, were de-
tected in the Love Canal area near Niagara Falls, N.Y. Chemical wastes buried 25 years 
earlier had corroded through drums and percolated through the soil into yards and 
basements. Since the health of many residents had been seriously damaged by the 
hazardous wastes, about 200 families were forced to evacuate in 1978 and 1979. EVERY-
BODY'S PROBLEM, supra note 2, at 6. 
u. About 25 miles south of Louisville, KY some 17,000 drums littered a seven-acre site 
which became known as the Valley of the Drums. Many of the 6000 drums that were full 
were oozing their toxic contents onto the ground. Approximately 200 organic chemicals 
and 30 metals were identified at the site. [d. at 2. 
12. EPA surveys have identified sites associated with a number of health problems, 
including kidney disease, cancer, mutations, and aborted pregnancies. Some sites have 
caused the closing of public and private drinking water wells, other sites have contami-
nated ground waters, and still others have damaged the indigenous species of adversely 
affected natural habitats. Stafford, supra note 6, at 10. 
13. [d. at 9. 
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sees improper hazardous waste disposal as a ticking time bomb 
about to explode.14 
With the nation's attention focused on what happens when 
hazardous waste is indiscriminately or improperly managed, the 
public sought protection from hazardous waste.15 Since permis-
sive and nonexistent state regulations had paved the way for the 
mismanagement of hazardous wastes,16 rules implementing the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA),17 the 
federal government's first entry into the area of hazardous waste 
control,18 were looked to for assurances of future safety. 
RCRA operates on the premises that public health and the 
environment can be protected if standards are followed for the 
proper management of hazardous wastes.19 Management, the 
handling of hazardous waste from the point of generation to the 
point of disposal, includes the transportation, storage, treatment, 
and disposal of wastes.20 All management activities except trans-
portation are carried out at waste facilities. Facilities, as defined 
by RCRA, include all land, structures, and improvements on the 
land for the storage, treatment, and disposal of hazardous 
wastes.21 Without proper facilities, public and environmental pro-
tection from the hazardous wastes cannot be achieved. 
Despite the integral role that facilities play in the management 
process, RCRA provided no guidelines for the siting of hazardous 
waste facilities. Instead, it left the states free to develop their own 
procedures for the location and use of suitable sites. The rationale 
behind leaving site control to the states was quite simple. Con-
gress believed that federal agencies would be too far removed 
from local problems to respond effectively,22 while local govern-
14. An Analysis of RCRA, supra note 1, at 637. 
15. See Worobec, An Analysis of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, [11 Curro 
Dev.] ENV'T REP. (BNA) 633, 634-35 (Aug. 22, 1980). 
16. Wolf, Public Opposition to Hazardous Waste Sites: The Self-Defeating Approach to 
National Hazardous Waste Control Under Subtitle C of the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act of 1976,8 B.C. ENVT'L AFF. L. REV. 463, 471 (1980). 
17. Pub. L. No. 94-580, 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1976). 
18. Wolf, supra note 16, at 472. 
19. I d. at 464. 
20. "'Management' ... means the systematic control of the collection, source separa-
tion, storage, transportation, processing, treatment, recovery, and disposal of hazardous 
waste." 40 C.F.R. § 260.10 (1980); 42 U.S.C. § 6903 (1976). 
21. 40 C.F.R. § 260.10 (1980); 42 U.S.C. § 6924 (1976). 
22. ENVIRONMENTAL PRoTECTION AGENCY, SITING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGE-
MENT FACILITIES AND PuBLIC OPPOSITION 27 (1979) (SW-809) [hereinafter cited as SITING 
AND PuBLIC OPPOSITION]. 
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ments would be too easily swayed by community political 
pressures to protect the immediate interests of their constitu-
ents.23 This left the states to playa pivotal role between the two 
levels of government.24 
Presently there is an acute shortage of environmentally suit-
able hazardous waste facilities. 25 This is due to the increased 
demand for capacity, and the mismatch in location of hazardous 
waste generators with hazardous waste facilities.26 As some 
facilities become full and others shut down for failure to comply 
with RCRA, the shortage will become even more serious. 
In addition, public fear of hazardous waste has complicated the 
siting problem by fueling resistance both to the location of new 
facilities and the operation of existing facilities.27 As a conse-
quence of the earlier disasters, public fear is rampant despite 
RCRA's safe management regulations.28 The public simply does 
not want hazardous waste facilities nearby and effectively voices 
its opposition to those facilities. As a result, citizens and local 
groups have successfully blocked the siting of waste facilities in 
their communities on a number of occasions. 
For example, in 1977, the residents of Rossville, Maryland tem-
porarily blocked the Allied Chemical Corporation from construct-
ing a waste facility in their town.29 A well-organized grass-roots 
effort convinced the townspeople that even development of a 
public park by the company was inadequate compensation for 
23. Facility siting is believed to be too emotional an issue to be handled at the local 
level. "You can't put a regional problem into the hands of a parochial board." Officials 
Discuss Problems of Siting Hazardous Waste Disposal Facilities, [10 Curro Dev.] ENV'T 
REP. (BNA) 81 (May 18, 1979). (Statement by Jeffrey Diver, Counsel for Environmental 
Affairs, West Management, Inc., Oak Brook, Illinois, a firm which manages eight 
hazardous waste disposal facilities around the country.) 
24. There are two possible extremes of government involvement in hazardous waste 
facility siting. One, an option which has yet to be exercised, is the siting, construction, 
ownership, and operation of facilities by the federal government. The other is the state 
review and approval of permit applications made by the industry 'which is totally 
responsible for the siting and development of facilities. SITING AND PUBUC OPPOSITION, 
supra note 22, at 27. 
25. See infra text at notes 89-90. 
26. See infra text at notes 91-94. 
27. EVERYBODY'S PROBLEM, supra note 2, at 35. 
28. Id. Examples of resistance to facilities already in existence are the landfill oper-
ated by Earthline, Inc. in Wilsonville, Illinois, shut down following a court challenge of 
its technical suitability, see infra notes 115, 131, 132, 220; and the sanitary landfill 
operated by the Resource Recovery Corporation in Pasco, Washington, shut down when 
the removal of a lapsed zoning variance was refused. See infra note 122. 
29. See infra notes 115, 130, 221. 
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their agreeing to reside near a "poison pit." The company's appli-
cation for a zoning variance was denied. 
In Ventura, California, residents rebuffed efforts to construct a 
hazardous waste landfill in the Padre Juan area.30 Reasons cited 
included fears that the facility would destroy the aesthetics of an 
otherwise unspoiled area, and would pose a risk of contamination 
to the nearby ocean. The proposal was abandoned in 1975. In 1977, 
the Industrial Environment Services Company applied for a per-
mit to operate a hazardous waste disposal site in Kirksville, Mis-
souri. Strong local opposition developed as a result of fears that 
Kirksville would become known as the site of the Midwest's 
hazardous waste facility. The application was withdrawn31 in 
1979. 
In Pasco, Washington, the county denied a zoning variance 
application by the Resource Recovery Corporation to continue 
operation of a sanitary landfill. The zoning board's 1974 decision 
apparently reflected community opposition, which centered on 
the fact that the site was mostly used to dump wastes generated 
from outside the county, and from local grape growers, who 
claimed that leaks from the landfill were harming their groves.32 
In 1975, the Starr Industrial Services Corporation proposed 
construction of a hazardous waste landfill in Starr County, Texas. 
Although the site was approved based on the. applicable technical 
criteria, local political pressure resulted in the State's denial of 
the permit request33 in 1977. 
Since public opposition has and can continue to block the siting 
of hazardous waste facilities, states have attempted to ease the 
siting process. Statutes have been enacted in a number of states 
to minimize local control over hazardous waste facility siting. 
These statutes have adopted two approaches: first, to diffuse local 
opposition by providing for community involvement in the siting 
process where appropriate; and second, to preempt local authority 
to block a proposed siting. 
This article will examine the state hazardous waste facility 
siting statutes currently in force. It first describes the hazardous 
waste problem and the federal government's failure to address 
the siting issue. It will then present an overview of various state 
30. See infra note 118. 
31. See infra note 121. 
32. See infra note 122. 
33. [d. 
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siting provisions. Finally, the potential effectiveness of these pro-
visions in easing the siting process will be examined, and a pro-
posal will be offered for those states wishing to enact siting legis-
lation. 
II. THE HAZARDOUS WASTE PROBLEM 
Hazardous wastes have been generated in significant quan-
tities for over forty years.34 Only recently have the dangers from 
these wastes become evident.35 As a consequence, management of 
hazardous waste has become one of the highest priority environ-
mental programs in the nation today.36 The goal of the program is 
to build a federal, state, and industrial partnership which will 
manage the handling and disposal of hazardous wastes.37 As the 
nation starts to examine in more detail the management of hazard-
ous wastes, the problems which complicate waste control emerge. 
A. Hazardous Waste Defined 
Hazardous wastes come in a variety of forms and are generated 
by the manufacturing of products used by Americans daily.38 For 
a waste to be classified under RCRA as hazardous, it must first be 
a "solid" waste.39 That term encompasses, in addition to just 
solids, liquids, semi-solids and contained gaseous materials result-
ing from industrial, commercial, mining or agricultural opera-
tions, or from community activities.40 A solid waste must then 
meet one of two criteria to be classified as hazardous: it must 1) 
cause or contribute significantly to serious illness or death, or 2) 
pose a substantial hazard to human health or the environment 
when it is improperly managed.41 
There are presently two methods used to identify wastes as 
hazardous under RCRA; the list approach, and the criteria ap-
proach.42 RCRA lists nearly 500 wastes as hazardous.43 The list 
34. See An Analysis of ReRA, supra note 1. 
35. See supra text and notes at notes 9-14. 
36. EPA Placing High Priority on Hazardous Waste Program, [10 Curro Dev.] ENV'T 
REP. (BNA) 29 (May 4, 1979) [hereinafter cited as EPA Placing High Priority]. 
37. Regulating Hazardous Wastes, 8 EPA JOURNAL 2, 2 (July-August 1982). 
39. 40 C.F.R. § 261.3 (1980). 
40. 40 C.F.R. § 261.2 (1980). 
41. 40 C.F.R. § 261.10 (1980). 
42. STATE DECISION-MAKERS GUIDE, supra note 2, at 3. 
43. Massachusetts Department of Environmental Management, Bureau of Solid 
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continually changes, and listing remains the most common 
method of hazardous waste identification.44 When substances 
either are not listed, or wastes are composed of a mixture of 
components, testing is employed.45 The wastes are tested for the 
presence of anyone of four criteria:46 1) ignitability - posing a fire 
hazard; 2) corrosivity - the ability to corrode standard contain-
ers; 3) reactivity - instability with a tendency to explode or react 
violently; and 4) EP toxicity - the presence of certain toxic 
materials at levels greater than specified in the regulations.47 Of 
the four, corrosivity and EP toxicity may produce chronic effects 
which are not likely to appear for a long period of time, while the 
release of hazardous substances having the other properties will 
produce immediate effects. 
Hazardous wastes enter the environment to cause their dam-
age through one or more of six major routes:48 1) ground water 
contamination via leachate;49 2) surface water contamination via 
runoff;50 3) air pollution via open burning, evaporation, sublima-
tion, or wind erosion;51 4) poisoning through direct contact;52 5) 
Waste Disposal, Hazardous Waste Management, in Massachusetts, Statewide Environ-
mental Impact Report 3.6 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Hazardous Waste Management in 
Massachusetts]. 
44. EVERYBODY'S PROBLEM, supra note 2, at 12. 
45. STATE DECISION-MAKERS GUIDE, supra note 2, at 3. 
46. 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.20-261.24 (1980). 
47. Hazardous Waste Management in Massachusetts, supra note 2, at 3.6. 
48. STATE DECISION-MAKERS GUIDE, supra note 2, at 10. 
49. For example, in 1978 drums containing pesticide wastes buried six years earlier 
leaked from a nearby landfill to contaminate the water supplies of Toone and Teague, 
Tennessee. The towns can no longer use their own ground water but must pump water in 
from other locations. EVERYBODY'S PROBLEM, supra note 2, at 1-2. 
Pesticide wastes deposited from 1943 to 1957 in unlined disposal ponds near Denver 
have contaminated the ground water in a 30-square mile area. If decontamination were 
possible, it would take several years and cost as much as $80 million. Id. 
50. For example, wildlife, stream life, and local vegetation were destroyed near Byron, 
Illinois by wastes from metal-finishing operations. The surface water was contaminated, 
as was the soil and ground water, when the toxic pollutants drained into the soil. I d. at 2. 
51. A young man was asphyxiated, for example, while discharging waste from his 
truck into an open pit in Iberville Parish, Louisiana. Id. at 2-5. Waste containing 
hexachlorobenzene (HCB) was disposed of in a landfill near Darron and Geismar, Louisi-
ana. The HCB vaporized and accumulated in cattle over a 100-square-mile area. In 
addition to the cattle, some area residents were found to have elevated levels of HCB. I d. 
52. The startling corrosive damage reported in 1978-1979 by residents of Love Canal, 
for example, was the result of chemicals percolating through the soil. Id. at 6-8. In 1979, 
cattle were rendered inedible in Kansas as a result of PCB contaminated waste oil used 
in animal backrubbers. 
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poisoning through the food chain;53 and 6) fire and explosion.54 No 
matter how they enter the environment, the release of hazardous 
wastes will almost invariably pose a severe threat to public 
health. Hazardous wastes can cause immediate harm when in-
haled, swallowed or brought in contact with the skin, or they can 
slowly cause damage over time.55 Hazardous wastes poison, cause 
cancers, produce birth defects, burn, blind, and kill.56 
B. Hazardous Waste Management Before RCRA 
Before the enactment of RCRA in 1976, most state waste man-
agement plans dealt strictly with solid waste.57 Only five states 
had comprehensive hazardous waste management legislation: 
California, Illinois, Minnesota, New York and Oregon.58 Other 
state waste management and planning statutes addressed only 
solid non-toxic wastes. Those states that regulated landfill use did 
not even uniformly require the separation of toxic from non-toxic 
wastes.59 They had no separate criteria for the special handling or 
disposal procedures required by the nature of toxic compounds.60 
States depended, rather, upon broad and sometimes incorrect 
interpretations of their solid waste statutes when regulating 
hazardous waste management.6! 
As a result, toxic wastes were disposed of under conditions that 
were adequate only for the disposal of non-toxic wastes. Many of 
the major hazardous waste management problems arose as a 
result of callous, careless actions.62 Even the inadequate stan-
53. In 1970, the children of an Alamogordo, New Mexico family suffered severe 
neurological damage after eating a home-slaughtered pig that had eaten corn treated 
with mercury. Id. at 5-6. In 1976, an Indiana family consumed milk contaminated with 
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). The milk was from the family's cow which grazed in a 
pasture fertilized with Bloomington's sewage sludge. Id. 
54. In 1978, a fire broke out at a disposal site in Chester, Pennsylvania. Firemen 
required medical treatment as a result of lung and skin irritation and the Commodore 
Barry Bridge was closed because of the dangers from the smoke. Id. at 5. In 1975, an 
explosion at a landfill in Edison Township, New Jersey killed a bulldozer operator. It was 
common practice to bury and compact drums containing chemical wastes. Id. 
55. STATE DECISION-MAKERS GUIDE, supra note 2, at 84. 
56. Wolf, supra note 16, at 467-68. 
57. Id. at n.36. 
58.Id. 
59. Hazardous Waste Disposal and the New State Siting Programs, 14 NAT. RE-
SOURCES L. 421, 429 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Hazardous Waste Disposal]. 
60.Id. 
61. Wolf, supra note 16, at n.36. 
62. See EVERYBODY'S PROBLEM, supra note 2, at 27. 
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dards in place were not followed. Generators either disposed of 
their wastes by the roadside or gave their wastes to irresponsible 
transporters. Transporters pocketed transportation fees and in-
discriminately dumped their cargos into the environment.63 
With the first annual Earth Day, the environmentally aware 
decade of the 1970's began.54 As supporters of the Earth Day 
movement were preparing for the first of their annual demon-
strations, Congress enacted the first Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act.65 This Act called for a comprehensive investigation 
of hazardous waste management practices, an investigation 
which led to the enactment of the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA).66 The next section will examine 
RCRA. 
III. HAZARDOUS WASTES MANAGEMENT UNDER RCRA: SITING 
REMAINS WITH THE STATES 
In 1976, the federal government responded to the hazardous 
waste problem with the enactment of RCRA.67 Although RCRA 
mandated the operation of safe hazardous waste management 
facilities, it was silent with respect to how and where these 
facilities were to be located. The legislative history of the statute 
reveals that this silence was intentional. 
A. History 
In the early 1970's, the EPA's Office of Solid Waste examined 
the problems associated with hazardous wastes.68 As a newly 
created agency under the Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare, the EPA had been given the responsibility of preparing a 
comprehensive report on hazardous waste disposal practices.EIi 
The preparation of the report had been directed by section 212 of 
the Resource Recovery Act of 1970,70 the amended version of the 
federal government's first legislation directly addressing the solid 
waste problem.71 The report indicated that the management of 
63. [d. 
64. Worobec, supra note 15, at 633-34. 
65. [d. at 634. 
66. [d. 
67. See supra note 17. 
68. An Analysis of RCRA, supra note 1, at 633. 
69. Wolf, supra note 16, at nA. 
70. [d. at n.2; STATE DECISION-MAKERS GUIDE, supra note 2, at 12. 
71. Wolf, supra note 16, at n.2. 
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the nation's hazardous waste was inadequate, that land disposal 
of hazardous waste was increasing, and that the uncontrolled 
discharge of hazardous wastes into the environment threatened 
the public health and welfare.72 As a result of the report, the Ford 
administration proposed that Congress enact legislation address-
ing the problems created by the increasing disposal of hazardous 
wastes on the land.73 At the time, there were adequate federal 
laws protecting the air and the water from hazardous pollutants, 
but none protecting the land.74 Congress responded to the Admin-
istration's proposal by enacting RCRA. 
B. RCRA 
RCRA established a "cradle to grave" control system to track 
hazardous substances from the time of generation to the time of 
disposal, and to insure that disposal practices would not pose a 
threat to people or the environment.75 The major provisions of the 
Act provide for the definition of hazardous waste;76 a manifest 
system to trace waste from its generation to its final disposal;77 
standards for the handling of waste by generators and transport-
ers;78 permit requirements for treatment, storage, and disposal 
facilities;79 and program requirements for hazardous waste man-
agement by the states.ffi 
Those who generate potentially hazardous wastes have the 
responsibility under RCRA of determining if a waste is hazard-
72. The EPA report found that: 
-Substantial quantities of toxic and otherwise hazardous industrial waste are 
generated annually. 
- Land disposal of these materials is increasing as a result of increased produc-
tion and consumption, and due to the institution of air and water pollution 
controls. 
-Regulation of nonradioactive hazardous wastes is, at present, nonexistent at 
the Federal level, and variable in extent and inconsistent in enforcement at 
both the state and local level. 
- There is little economic incentive for generators to dispose of their hazardous 
waste in an environmentally adequate manner. 
STATE DECISION-MAKERS GUIDE, supra note 2, at 12. 
73.Id. 
74. EVERYBODY'S PROBLEM, supra note 2, at 9. 
75. RCRA §§ 3001-3011, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6931 (1976). 
76. Worobec, supra note 15, at 640. 
77.Id. 
78.Id. 
79.Id. 
80.Id. 
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OUS.81 Once the determination is made, the stringent record keep-
ing and reporting requirements of the Act apply.82 The system 
was designed to stop the indiscriminate dumping of hazardous 
wastes. It was thought that monitoring by transporters, 
generators, and facility operators83 would discourage such acts by 
providing a means of detecting the failure of wastes to reach 
management facilities.84 Congress believed that the monitoring 
system, combined with management standards and violator sanc-
tions, would protect the environment from the dangers of the 
careless disposal of hazardous wastes.85 
Under RCRA, the states may replace the federal hazardous 
waste management program with programs of their own. This 
may be done if the two are shown to be "substantially equiva-
lent."86 Since RCRA's regulations are being issued in stages,87 the 
states may operate their own programs on a stage-by-stage au-
thorization basis, or may wait, operate under the federal program 
until all regulations are promulgated, and apply for final ap-
proval. The issuance by the federal government of final authori-
zation is dependent upon the "equivalence" of the state program 
to the federal program and its "consistency" with other state 
programs.88 
The success of RCRA is unclear. It may even be argued that the 
statute has exacerbated the disposal problem. The need for dis-
81. RCRA § 1004(5), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (1976); see supra text at notes 39-47. 
82. RCRA § § 1004 (12), 42 U.S.C. § 6903 (12) (1976). 
83. EVERYBODY'S PROBLEM, supra note 2, at 26. 
84. EVERYBODY'S PROBLEM, supra note 2, at 26. 
85. Worobec, supra note 15, at 636. 
86. States Active in Hazardous Waste Control, 8 EPA J. 14, 14 (July-August 1982) 
[hereinafter cited as States Active]. 
87. The regulations were issued in two phases. Phase 1 addresses the identification 
and listing of hazardous wastes as well as generator, transporter, owner and 
operator requirements for treatment, storage, and disposal facilities. Phase 2 governs 
facility permits and permits for containers, tanks, waste piles, surface impoundments, 
and incinerators. The Phase 1 regulations took four years to complete and became 
effective in 1980, while the Phase 2 regulations became effective in 1981. [d. 
Phase 2 regulations establishing technical standards for storage, treatment, and 
disposal facilities have yet to undergo public hearings. MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT 
OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ENGINEERING, HAZARDOUS WASTE UPDATE 1 (Sept. 
1982). Before RCRA was passed, 21 states had some form of hazardous waste law. In 1977 
and 1978, 27 states passed new or improved hazardous waste legislation. EPA Placing 
High Priority, supra note 36, at 29. By September 1983 it was expected that 45 states 
would have received authorization for Phase I, and 30 states for Phase 2. In those states 
not yet authorized, the EPA runs the programs with the state's cooperation and assis-
tance. States Active, supra note 93, at 14. 
88. States Active, supra note 86, at 14. 
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, 
posal sites has increased subsequent to RCRA's passage, while 
site availability has decreased.!ll Sites which are found not to 
comply with RCRA regulations are required to be closed or up-
graded within five years.lj() With marginal sites closing rather 
than being improved, the disposal problem becomes compounded. 
Even when facilities comply with federal regulations, there is a 
mismatch problem.91 The nation has facility capacity to deal with 
almost twice the volume of waste generated,92 but those indus-
tries which require their use are not located near existing 
facilities. Hazardous wastes are concentrated in the major indus-
trial sectors of the country93 while the disposal facilities are not.94 
For this and other reasons, the continued siting of hazardous 
waste facilities, particularly in areas of heavy waste generation, is 
critical. The next section examines facility siting under RCRA. 
C. RCRA and Facility Siting 
For a number of reasons, RCRA has left the siting of hazardous 
waste facilities to the states.95 It was believed that the federal 
government was too far removed to adequately address specific 
local needs, while local governments were perceived to be too 
89. See Wolf, supra note 16, at 478. 
90. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, 1978 REPORT, BETTER HEALTH & REGU-
LATORY REFORM, 16 (1979) [hereinafter cited as BETTER HEALTH]. 
91. Hazardous Waste Site Shortage Possible in Five Regions Despite Overall Surplus, 
(11 Curro Dev.) ENV'T REP. (BNA) 988 (November 7, 1980). 
92. [d. 
93. About 60% of all hazardous waste is generated in ten states: New Jersey, Illinois, 
Ohio, California, Pennsylvania, Texas, New York, Michigan, Tennessee and Indiana. 
EVERYBODY'S PROBLEM, supra note 2, at 14. 
94. According to an EPA report prepared by Booz, Allen and Hamilton, Inc., and 
Putman, Hayes and Bartlett, Inc., the following EPA regions have possible shortages: 1-
New England (Boston); V - Upper Midwest (Chicago); VII - Midwest (Kansas City); VIII -
West (Denver); and X - Northwest (Seattle). The following regions were reported to have 
a facility surplus: II - New York, New Jersey; III - Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, 
West Virginia, Virginia, and the District of Columbia; IV - Kentucky, Tennessee, North 
Carolina, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina and Florida; VI - New Mexico, 
Oklahoma, Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas; and IX - California, Nevada, Arizona, 
Hawaii. EPA Contractors' Report Predicts Disposal Shortages in Five Regions, [11 Curro 
Dev.] ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1107 (November 28, 1980). 
95. The reasons cited were that: 1) states are more familiar with their people, prob-
lems and solutions; 2) they are better able to tailor a program to the needs of their 
citizens; 3) it is better to build upon already existing programs in states than to preempt 
or needlessly duplicate them; 4) state involvement results in greater public participation 
and education; 5) without a strong state role, siting of facilities is likely to be more 
difficult; and 6) states have traditionally regulated waste activities under their police 
power to further public health and sanitation. Wolf, supra note 16, at n.208. 
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emotionally involved and susceptible to community pressures to 
accept facilities.96 A governmental body having a broad yet un-
biased perspective was needed. Such a body would look beyond 
the limited site area to the surrounding communities to evaluate 
the total impact of a proposed facility. The states seemed to fill 
this role, and were left by the federal government to establish 
their own siting plans. 
With no federal laws and little guidance given from the EPA,97 
the states were left with great latitude in siting the needed 
facilities.98 Left with the authority not only over whether or not to 
accept facilities, but also over where they would be located, states 
enacted siting statutes which addressed how best to site an envi-
ronmentally, economically, and politically acceptable facility. The 
siting of hazardous waste facilities will now be examined in 
greater detail. 
IV. HAZARDOUS WASTE FACILITY SITING 
As noted earlier, hazardous waste facilities constructed for the 
purpose of treating, storing and permanently disposing of 
hazardous wastes99 are central to any hazardous waste man-
agement program. Since RCRA left the states with primary re-
sponsibility over facility siting, the degree to which RCRA suc-
ceeds in providing for the safe management of hazardous wastes 
is independent upon each state's ability to site needed facilities. This 
section will first present an overview of the different types of 
hazardous waste facilities. It will then examine the siting process 
and the nature of community opposition to facility sitings. 
A. What is a Facility 
Hazardous waste facilities are not just landfills. Rather, there 
are six major types of facilities for the safe treatment and disposal 
of hazardous wastes. Each may stand alone a.s a separate facility 
or serve as a component of an integrated complex.I!lO The six types 
96. States Will Have To Take Lead in Waste Facility Siting, Study Says, [10 Curro Dev.] 
ENV'T REP. (BNA) 2006 (February 15, 1980). 
97. See Siting of Hazardous Waste Management Facilities: A Major Problem Facing 
Industry and States, [12 Curro Dev.] ENV'T REP. (BNA) 871, 873 (November 13, 1981) 
[hereinafter cited as Siting: A Major Problem]. 
98.Id. 
99. See supra text at notes 25-26. 
100. CLARK-McGLENNON ASSOCIATES, AN INTRODUCTION TO FACILITIES FOR 
HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT; IV-v (1980). 
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are: 1) waste transfer centers where wastes are analyzed, iden-
tified, and separated for further processing or transportation to 
other facilities;IOI 2) liquid organics recovery facilities where liquid 
organic wastes are further analyzed for the presence of valuable, 
reclaimable constituents; 102 3) solidification, stabilization, and 
other specialized treatment facilities for the purpose of changing 
liquids into solids, making wastes less of a threat to ground water 
pollution, and destroying the harmful components of the 
wastes;103 4) aqueous treatment facilities for the purpose of ren~ 
dering water contaminated during other processes fit for drink-
ing;104 5) incineration facilities where non-reclaimable, combusti-
ble organic liquids and solids are broken down into their basic 
elements;l05 and 6) secure landfills where only those wastes for 
which recovery is not feasible are permanently stored in leak-
proof, earthen containmentsYl6 
Although a facility may stand alone, it does not function as a 
totally independent unit. Rather, it can and often does interrelate 
with other types of facilities. l07 For example, a liquid organics 
recovery operation that analyzes liquid wastes for the purpose of 
treatment determination may direct some wastes to be broken 
down at incineration facilities, others to be encapsulated at solid· 
ification facilities, and still others to be disposed of permanently 
at landfill facilities. 
It is the siting of these six types of facilities to which RCRA is 
directed, and which has generated tremendous controversy in 
communities across the country. The two approaches used by the 
states to plan and approve particular sitings will now be exam-
ined. 
B. Two Approaches to Siting 
There are two general approaches to the siting of hazardous 
waste management facilities. Some states have adopted a system 
of advanced site designation. lOS Most, however, approve or disap-
prove the siting of facilities on an ad hoc basis. 
101. [d. 
102. [d. 
103. [d. 
104. [d. 
105. [d. 
106. [d. 
107. [d. at V. 
108. See Hazardous Waste Disposal, supra note 59, at 437. 
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Under an ad hoc system, a facility developer, usually a corpora-
tion in the business of constructing and operating hazardous 
waste management facilities, will propose a facility to a state 
which it believes has sufficient industry need to support that 
facility. 1011 The developer will file the appropriate permit applica-
tion for construction of the facility, and await response from the 
appropriate state regulatory agency. That agency will review the 
application according to the rules promulgated by the state and 
render a decision Which either grants approval, grants con-
tingency approval (requiring specific proposal modifications), or 
rejects the proposal outright yo 
The advanced site designation approach operates to review 
potential sites for suitability prior to the receipt of a developer's 
proposa1.1l1 Under this system, a state body studies the state 
hazardous waste management need, determines the type and 
number of facilities required to meet that need, then reviews and 
approves sites around the state to potentially fill that need.ll2 The 
state may then solicit a developer to construct a facility at an 
approved site, or may retain the sites in inventory for future 
development.113 
Regardless of whether states approve particular sitings on an 
ad hoc basis or by a system of advanced site designation, approval 
of a particular site is likely to generate significant controversy. A 
proposal to site a facility in any area will always face some com-
munity opposition. The nature of that opposition will now be 
examined. 
c. Public Opposition to Facility Sitings 
Public opposition to the siting of hazardous waste management 
facilities is so strong114 that it is the most critical problem in 
developing new facilities. Communities fear that property values 
will decline,115 and that they will be unable to keep out other such 
109. [d. 
110. [d. at 438. 
111. [d. at 443. 
112. [d. 
113. [d. 
114. See Butterfield, New England Town Rises Up to Block a Toxic Waste Plant, N.Y. 
Times, Oct. 17, 1981, at A1, col. 5; Town Sues to Block Waste Plant's Construction, 
Middlesex News, Jan. 9, 1982, at 9, col. 1. 
115. In the thwarted attempt by Allied Chemical Corporation to site a landfill in 
Rossville, Maryland, one of the major concerns of the community had been its image. 
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facilities once one is located,u6 They are opposed to the resulting 
increase in noise, truck traffic, and odor;117 they question the 
potential adverse impacts upon aesthetics and the quality of 
life;1l8 and most significantly, they fear the potential threat to 
public health, especially in densely populated areas,u9 
Communities which do not generate or generate very little 
hazardous waste have additional concerns. They do not under-
stand or accept the need for a facility,t20 do not want to take risks 
for industries which are not located in their area, and wish to 
protect their community's image from becoming that of a "dump-
ing ground."121 Their resistance to facility proposals is, conse-
The residents wanted to uplift the reputation of the area rather than to further degrade 
it to the level of a "poison pit." Rossville did not want to be a depository for the waste of 
other communities. A local pastor had spoken to residents regarding the property value 
decline that they would experience as a consequence of the landfill, and emphasized the 
fact that residents would be losing control over community lands. SITING AND PUBUC 
OPPOSITION, supra note 22, at 176-89. 
A hazardous waste landfill operated by Earthline Inc. in Wilsonville, Illinois was shut 
down by court order following a trial challenging the technical suitability of the site. 
During the trial, concerns were expressed by the local population that the facility had an 
adverse effect upon local property values. Because the landfill was close to the village of 
Wilsonville, residents felt that their houses were not as marketable as they were prior to 
the landfill's existence. Id. at 303-16. 
116. Despite the fact that the local residents voiced a concern that once permission 
was given to open a hazardous waste landfill the town would not be able to keep other 
such facilities out, a permit for a temporary on-site landfill was issued to the Chemolite 
Division of the 3M Company for its Cottage Grove, Minnesota facility. Id. at 110-19. 
117. EVERYBODY'S PROBLEM, supra note 2, at 35. 
118. The owners of the Cal bas as landfill in Los Angeles, California had voiced a desire 
to expand its hazardous waste dumping into the front canyon immediately adjacent to 
its present facility. The major objection to the expansion by local residents was based 
upon aesthetic concerns. A housing development is situated with a view of the surround-
ing hills. It was argued that this view would be adversely affected if expansion were 
approved. SITING AND PUBUC OPPOSITION, supra note 22, at 292-302. 
The proposed siting of a hazardous waste landfill in the Padre Juan section of Ventura, 
California was abandoned because local opponents objected to, among other things, the 
visual impact that the facility would have on the otherwise unspoiled area. Id. at 245-55. 
119. The citizens of Furley, Kansas opposed the siting of a hazardous waste landfill in 
their community for a number of reasons. These included the concern over contamina-
tion of surface and ground water, and the fact that the site was near a heavily populated 
area. Although the area itself was not densely populated, the residents felt that its close 
proximity to Wichita, an area likely to become increasingly populous within the next 
twenty years, posed too significant a threat. Id. at 120-33. 
120. See O'Hare, "Not on My Block You Don't": Facility Siting and the Strategic 
Importance of Compensation, 25 PUB. POL'y 407, 409 (Fall 1977). 
121. Industrial Environmental Services withdrew a permit application to operate a 
hazardous waste disposal site in Kirksville, Missouri in the face of strong public opposi-
tion. One impact of special concern to the residents of the town was that Kirksville would 
become known as the hazardous waste dump of the Midwest. SITING AND PuBUC 
OPPOSITION, supra note 22, at 220-32. 
1984] HAZARDOUS WASTE FACILITY 771 
quently, very strong and is aimed at preventing the importation 
of hazardous waste.122 
Local opposition does not necessarily stem from an individual 
community's own experiences with hazardous waste. They are 
often based instead upon accounts in the press of incidents at 
other facilities. l23 By focusing almost exclusively upon disasters, 
the press inflames the hazardous waste management issue and 
makes siting especially difficult.l24 The magnitude of the difficulty 
is demonstrated by the fact that the public is unable or unwilling 
to see newly proposed facilities as different from those that were 
carelessly, indifferently, or ignorantly mismanaged in the pasU25 
Sometimes, the tone of this resistance may be set by the timing of 
adverse national publicity.l26 At other times, the press inflames 
122. The operation of a sanitary landfill by the Resource Recovery Corporation in 
Pasco, Washington was shut down in the face of public opposition when a lapsed zoning 
variance was refused renewal. The site had little local support since it primarily serviced 
industrial and agricultural wastes from not only outside the county, but from through-
out the Pacific Northwest. Consequently, faced with threats from local grape growers 
who were already suffering harm from an unknown source, the county denied the zoning 
permit. Id. at 317-31. 
A hazardous waste landfill operated by Earthline Inc., a division of SCA Services in 
Wilsonville, Illinois was shut down by court order shortly after the local residents 
learned of a shipment of PCB contaminated earth from Dittmer, Missouri. Although fear 
of PCBs was probably the major source of opposition, the fact that the contaminated 
earth was from out of state contributed to the opposition. See id. at 303-16. 
As a result of a grant awarded to the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, the State of 
Minnesota attempted unsuccessfully to site a chemical landfill which had won EPA 
approval for demonstrating the best available technology for land disposal of hazardous 
wastes. Opposition to a rural siting of the landfill was strong because residents opposed 
the use of their land as a dumping ground for urban generated wastes. It was also felt 
that industry would be attracted to the proposed facility site, leading to urban develop-
ment of agricultural land. Support for the siting was offered by urban legislators whose 
districts were not likely to be selected as the site district, but whose industries would 
benefit from the facility. Id. at 190-206. 
Although a site proposed as a hazardous waste landfill by Starr Industrial Services in 
Starr County, Texas was approved on technical criteria, local opposition in the form of 
intense political pressure against the dumping of Houston's wastes in Starr County 
resulted in the denial of the permit request. Id. at 207-19. 
123. EVERYBODY'S PROBLEM, supra note 2, at 35. 
124. Public Must Accept Risk in Siting New Waste Facilities, Conference Told [12 Curro 
Dev.] ENV'T REP. (BNA) 316 (July 3, 1981). 
125. SITING AND PuBLIC OPPOSITION, supra note 22, at 22. 
126. At the height of the evaluation for continued operation of a hazardous waste 
facility operated by SCA Services in Model City, New York, a state of emergency was 
declared in the area surrounding Love Canal. With the two areas only 10 miles apart, the 
reported disastrous effects of poorly managed waste disposal served as support for the 
Model City opponents who did not want to be the "Love Canal" of the future. Id. at 
256-79. 
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opposition by alerting a community to resistance activities taken 
by other communities.127 
The total consequence of press accounts has been that the 
public has discovered the power to prevent the siting of hazard-
ous waste facilities128 and has exercised that power. Community 
residents have circulated petitions, given testimony at public 
hearings, initiated or threatened to initiate lawsuits,129 and have 
sent letters to regulatory agencies and to the media. They have 
organizedl30 protest marches, demonstrations, and campaigns 
against the facilities which have been both peaceful and violent. 
The more violent actions have included threats directed both 
against the facilityl31 and against the personnel administering the 
siting process.132 
Since hazardous waste facilities cannot be sited in the face of 
such opposition, states interested in easing the siting process and 
127. [d. at IV. 
128. See O'Hare, supra note 120, at 409. 
129. Opponents to facility sitings may initiate law suits because they delay sitings for 
months or even years, and add substantially to the facility sponsor's costs. SITING AND 
PUBLIC OPPOSITION, supra note 22, at V. 
130. The opposition is apt to organize more rapidly in a community where there have 
been prior siting attempts or where residents are already active members in political 
organizations. For example, when Allied Chemical Corporation unsuccessfully at-
tempted to site a private landfill at its facility in Rossville, Maryland, in which it could 
dispose of its chrome ore wastes, it was met with opposition from the major political 
leaders in the area as well as an early, strong, and well-organized citizen's effort. 
Strength for the opponents' campaign was drawn from local community improvement 
groups and from political clubs that existed prior to the siting attempt. See id. at 176-89. 
When Earthline, a subsidiary of SCA Services, attempted to site a small commercial 
landfill for the disposal of hazardous waste in Bordentown, New Jersey, it was met by 
highly organized opposition which had arisen during a previous siting attempt by Dow 
Chemical to site a chemical tank farm. In response to the Dow attempt, local residents 
had organized into a 300 member group called "Help our Polluted Environment" 
(HOPE). As a result, the entire Bordentown area had been sensitized to environmental 
issues. When Earthline entered the scene with its proposal, HOPE responded with 
informational meetings to warn residents of the risks involved in the proposal as well as 
to alert them of SCA's questionable credibility. HOPE also held a week of "anti-Earth-
line," "pro-people" events, which included a three-hour parade and rally complete with 
floats, banners and a car caravan. [d. at 157-75. 
131. In the period just prior to the court ordered closing of the Earthline Inc. operated 
landfill in Wilsonville, Illinois, public tensions had risen to such a height that the 
residents had armed themselves and gathered into an angry mob. Some members of the 
crowd were even reported to have threatened to blow up the facility with dynamite. [d. 
at 303-16. 
132. During an attempt in Minnesota to site a "federal demonstration" chemical waste 
landfill, a bus touring four proposed sites carrying various agency staff members, council 
members, consultants, members of the news media, and other interested persons, was 
met at each site by protesters. [d. at 190-206. 
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minimizing local control must develop specific mechanisms to do 
80. Some states have already enacted siting statutes. The re-
mainder of this article will examine the siting statutes currently 
in force. The statutes adopt one or both of the two available 
approaches to neutralizing local opposition: 1) the "cooptation" 
approach, which diffuses opposition by providing for local in-
volvement in the siting process, and 2) the preemption approach, 
which takes away a community's legal means of blocking a pro-
posed siting. 
V. STATE SITING PROVISIONS 
Most state siting statutes provide mechanisms for the en-
hanced participation of the public in the evaluation of hazardous 
waste facility siting applications. These mechanisms reflect the 
concern of state legislators with both the impact of public opposi-
tion upon siting and the need to overcome that opposition in order 
to site RCRA approved facilitiesy3:3 Recognizing that totally 
excluding local participation from the siting process is politically 
unfeasible and, if anything, would serve only to antagonize site 
communities, thereby stimulating additional opposition, states 
enacted statutes giving local authorities some role in the siting 
process. It was generally believed that participation throughout 
the process would promote cooperation and diffuse opposition.l34 
133. States recognized that the increase in economic and population growth had 
resulted in the increased generation of hazardous wastes, UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-14a-2; 
that the improper treatment, storage and disposal of hazardous waste substantially 
impairs the environment and public health, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13: IE-50; that the "eco-
nomic benefits to the state from industry are jeopardized" if proper treatment disposal 
and storage facilities are not available within the state, 1981 Comm. Pub. Acts 81-369; 
and that the shortage of approved facility sites is expected to increase. UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 26-14a-2. In order to establish a mechanism for the rational siting of hazardous waste 
facilities which will meet the needs of increased industrial expansion and treat, dispose, 
and store the reSUlting wastes, states recognized the need to include the public in the 
siting process. New Jersey, for example, declared that the "informed participation ofthe 
public and of elected and appointed officials at all levels of government is essential" to site 
an adequate number of facilities. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13: IE-50 (Supp. 1982). Indiana found 
that it was necessary to provide for "effective public participation" to successfully site 
facilities. IND. STAT. ANN. § 13-7-8.6-1 (Supp. 1982). 
134. Toward the goal of minimizing opposition, the New England Regional Commis-
sion (NERCOM), a commission composed of the six governors of the New England States 
and a federal co-chairman appointed by the President, contracted with Clark-McGlennon 
Associates (CMA) to produce four "Handbooks for Siting Acceptable Facilities in New 
England." These handbooks were designed as primers that would describe the technical 
characteristics of facilities and sites in layman's language. It was hoped that their use 
would produce "more productive communication-particularly between supporters and 
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In addition, some statutes nullify local authority by preempting 
the laws of local jurisdictions which can be used to prevent a 
facility siting. Statutes which can be employed by communities to 
veto a facility sitil.g include land use laws, laws which address 
hazardous waste management in particular, and statutes which 
proscribe the transportation of hazardous waste. Siting statutes 
also give states, in some cases, the authority to circumvent local 
control by exercising their eminent domain powers to acquire the 
land on which a facility is to be constructed. 
No two state siting statutes are the same;l35 provisions vary as 
to the degree and manner of local participation provided. Some 
states preempt all local laws which can be used to block facility 
sitings, while others permit some, or even total, local control. 
This section will examine the different types of provisions which 
have been incorporated in state siting statutes. It will first exam-
ine the provision of local representation in the site application and 
review process, including local representation on state review 
boards and counsels, the establishment of local advisory groups 
and assessment committees, and the provision of state funding to 
assist local review groups. Second, statutes providing for partici-
pation by the general public will be examined. Third, the negotia-
tion process between the host community and the facility sponsor 
opponents of a facility." CLARK-McGLENNON ASSOCIATES, DEVELOPING ACCEPTABLE 
HAZARDOUS WASTE FACILITIES 7 (1980). CMA also published a Phase II Final Report 
(under contract with NERCOM) in which it made recommendations that focused on how 
to effectively overcome local opposition and make a facility "acceptable to the commu-
nity as a whole ... despite the minority opposition which is likely to remain ... after ... 
agreements are finalized." [d. at 13-14. 
135. The following are the state statutes studied for the purposes of this article: ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-2801 to -2806 (Supp. 1982); CA. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 
25,100-25,382 (Supp. 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-115 to -134 (Supp. 1982); FLA. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 403.72-.725 (Supp. 1982); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 43-2901 to -2914 (Supp. 1982); 
ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 111.5 §§ 1039-1042 (Supp. 1982); IND. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-7-8.6-1 to -15 
(Supp. 1982); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 455B.130 to .141 (Supp. 1982); KAN.STAT. ANN. §§ 
65-3402 to -3450 (Supp. 1982); Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 224.855-.866 (Supp. 1982); ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 38 §§ 1301-A-1310-B (Supp. 1982); MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 3-701 to -713 
(Supp. 1982); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D §§ 1-19 (West Supp. 1982); MICH. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 13.30(1)-(51) (1980 and Supp. 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 115A.04-.30 (Supp. 1982); 
Mo. STAT. ANN. §§ 260.350-.430 (Supp. 1982); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 81-1521.01 to -1521.07 
(Supp. 1980); N.J. STAT ANN. §§ 13:1E-49 to 91 (Supp. 1982); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSER. LAW §§ 
27-1101 to -1107 (McKinney Supp. 1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 130-166.16 to -166.21E (Supp. 
1981); Omo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3734.01-.22 (Page Supp. 1982); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 459.410-
.690 (Chapters Replaced 1979-1980); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35 §§ 6018.101-.1003 (Purdon 
Supp. 1982); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 26-14a-l to -14a-9, §§ 26-14b-l to -14b-18 (Supp. 1981); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.105.010-.105.140 (Supp. 1982); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 144.60-.79 
(Supp. 1982). 
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will be discussed. Some siting statutes explicitly provide that 
incentive compensation be provided, or other mitigation mea-
sures be taken by the facility sponsor, as agreed upon during such 
negotiations. Finally, preemption and eminent domain provisions 
will be examined. 
A. Local Representation in the Site Application and Review 
Process 
1. Local Participation at the State Level of Review 
Pursuant to RCRA, which left states authority over facility 
siting,136 most states have regulatory boards or councils to oversee 
hazardous waste management. They are responsible for making 
policy decisions and promulgating and implementing the legisla-
tion necessary for compliance with RCRA regulations.137 Al-
though some states have only these regulatory boards,138 a dis-
tinctive feature of many state siting programs is the creation of 
special siting boardsY39 These siting boards act primarily as per-
136. See supra text and notes at notes 95-98. 
137. See supra text and notes at notes 75-80. 
138. Those states having only regulatory boards are California, Florida, Georgia, 
Missouri, Pennsylvania and Utah. 
139. The twelve states having special siting boards are: Connecticut, CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. 22a-119 (Supp. 1982) (provides for a thirteen member siting council; four 
members are to be ad hoc local representatives, three from the municipality in which the 
proposed facility is to be located and the fourth from the neighboring municipality most 
affected by the proposed facility); Indiana, IND. STAT. ANN. § 13-7-8.6-3 (Supp. 1982) (the 
solid waste facility site approval authority consists of five statewide members and four 
local members, two of which are from the town which contains or is closest to the 
proposed facility, and two of which are from the unincorporated portion of the county in 
which the site is located); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3432 (Supp.1982) (the Hazardous 
Waste Disposal Facility Approval Board is a five member board which has no local 
representatives); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1305-A(2) (Supp. 1982) (provides that the 
municipal legislative body in which the facility is to be located may appoint four rep-
resentatives to the ten member Board of Environmental Protection for the purposes of 
site review); Maryland, MD. NAT. RES. CODE. ANN. § 3-703 (Supp. 1982) (provides for a 
seven member Hazardous Waste Facilities Siting Board, and there is no provision for 
local representation); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D § 4 (West Supp. 
1982) (the Massachusetts Hazardous Waste Facility Site Safety Council consists of 21 
members, and two residents from the host community may be added for the purposes of 
site selection); Michigan, MICH. STAT. ANN. § 13.30(17) (1980) (the Michigan site approval 
board consists of five permanent positions and four temporary positions to be filled by 
two residents of the host municipality and by two residents of the county in which the 
disposal facility is to be located); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115A.04 (Supp. 1982) 
(the Waste Management Board of Minnesota consists of eight permanent members and 
six temporary local representatives); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1E-52, -54 (Supp. 
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mitting authorities, reviewing and ruling upon specific siting pro-
posals as they are received. The membership of these siting 
boards is not limited to one agency. It can and does extend across 
agency lines to include representatives of several agencies. The 
diversity of membership provides a variety of administrative and 
policy perspectives. 
Siting boards range in size from the five member boards of 
Kansas l40 and Ohio141 to the twenty-one to twenty-three member 
board of Massachusetts.l42 In addition to evaluating site applica-
tions, the boards of New Jersey,t43 Minnesota,t44 and Marylandl45 
perform the broader responsibilities of site planning. Site plan-
ning is the designation by a state of technically preferred sites in 
advance of a specific facility proposal,146 The sites are then either 
developed or kept in inventory for future use. 
New Jersey's commission works in conjunction with an advisory 
council to propose and adopt sites of the number and type pro-
vided by the state hazardous waste facilities plan.147 Minnesota's 
board works independently to select locations and solicit commer-
cial permit applications to develop them.l48 Maryland's board 
makes the final site choice for the statewide plan from an inven-
tory of potential sites prepared by its environmental service.l49 
Of the twelve states which provide for special siting au-
thorities,t5O all but four reserve positions for local representatives 
1982) (both a nine-member hazardous waste facilities siting commission and a thirteen-
member advisory council are provided for, which work together on siting, although 
neither body has any local representatives); New York, N.Y. ENVTL. CONSER. LAW § 
27-1105(d) (McKinney Supp. 1982) (the Facility Siting Board of New York is an eight 
member board of which three are residents of the judicial district in which the facility is 
to be located); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130-166.17B (Supp. 1981) (the fifteen-
member Governor's.Waste Management Board adds two local officials from the govern-
ing body of the city or county in which the proposed site is located); and, Ohio, Omo REV. 
CoDE ANN. § 3734.05 (Page Supp. 1982) (the Hazardous Waste Facility Approval Board 
provides for no local representation). 
140. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3432 (Supp. 1982). 
141. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3734.05 (Page Supp. 1982). 
142. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D § 4 (West Supp. 1982). 
143. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1E-52 (Supp. 1982). 
144. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115A.04, .21 (Supp. 1982). 
145. MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 3-710 (Supp. 1982). 
146. See supra text and notes at notes 111-13. 
147. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1E-59 (Supp. 1982). 
148. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115A.21 (Supp. 1982). 
149. MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 3-710 (Supp. 1982). 
150. See supra note 139. 
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during proposal reviews.lS1 None of the three states which per-
form site planning provides for local representation on its board 
during the site planning process/52 but one does add six tempo-
rary local representatives for the review of specific site requests.l53 
Positions on state boards reserved for local representatives are 
filled on an ad hoc basis following the filing of a site application by 
representatives from the proposed host community, and repre-
sent less than a majority of the seats on any state siting board. 
Despite the fact that these temporary positions may represent as 
little as nine percent of the total membership of the state au-
thority,l54 the provision for even a small percentage of local rep-
resentation during the permitting process indicates an attempt 
by the state to make site selection acceptable to the host commu-
nity. Too large a percentage of local representation might shift 
site control to the host community, and the provision of even 
minimal local representation is viewed by some states as a way to 
minimize local opposition by insuring some local input at the state 
planning level. 
In summary, state siting boards have been designed to 
legitimize the selection of sites for hazardous waste management 
facilities. As specialized permitting authorities, they provide ex-
tensive technical review of site applications. With their member-
ship extending into mUltiple agencies, they approach site evalua-
tion from a broad analytical perspective. Those states which re-
serve temporary board positions for host community representa-
tives demonstrate an attempt to provide the host community with 
a voice in the siting process. The boards are designed, however, in 
such. a way as to preserve the role of the state as the siting 
authority and prevent the shift of control to the local community. 
151. The four statutes which do not provide for local representation on state siting 
boards during proposal reviews are: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3432 (Supp. 1982); MD. NAT. 
RES. CODE ANN. § 3-710 (Supp. 1982); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1E-52 (Supp. 1982); and OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 3734.05 (Page Supp. 1982). 
152. The three states which perform site planning are New Jersey, Minnesota and 
Maryland. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1E-52 (Supp. 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115A.21 
(Supp. 1982); and MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 3-710 (Supp. 1982). 
153. Minnesota does add local representatives for the purposes of project review. 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115A.21 (Supp. 1982). 
154. Some boards provide for local representation which accounts for up to 44% of 
board membership. See IND. STAT. ANN. § 13-7-8.6-3 (Supp. 1982); MICH. STAT. ANN. 
§ 13.30(17) (1980 & Supp. 1982); and MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115A.04 (Supp. 1982). 
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2. The Local Level of Review 
Twelve states limit local representation in the site application 
and review process to temporary positions on state boards,155 In 
an attempt to expand this limited local role, three states, Connect-
icut,l56 Massachusetts,157 and Minnesota 158 have added another 
level of local participation in the site review process. These states 
have provided for local review bodies, called local advisory groups 
or assessment committees, composed solely of local representa-
tives. 
Connecticut's local project review committee is formed at the 
discretion of the chief elected official of the host municipality.1OO 
Consisting of not less than four and not more than nine members, 
the members are appointed by the chief elected official. It is their 
responsibility to negotiate directly with the facility developer re-
garding the provision of incentives for development desired by the 
host community.lOO The state siting council acts as the sole arbit-
rator of any disputes arising from the negotiations, and considers 
the success of negotiations in reviewing the developer's facility 
application.161 Upon rendering a decision regarding the facility 
application, the state siting council incorporates into its approval 
those negotiated items that have been accepted. 
Massachusetts' local assessment committee is also formed by 
the chief executive officer of the proposed host community.l62 
Should that individual fail to take appropriate action within the 
specified time period, however, the state siting council is au-
thorized to establish and appoint the committee's members. Once 
established, the local committee's primary responsibility is to 
negotiate with the developer the terms, provisions, and conditions 
of a siting agreement to be entered into between the host com-
munity and the developer.l63 The agreement may address the 
155. See supra note 139. 
156. Connecticut has a four to nine member local project review committee. CONN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-127 (Supp. 1982). 
157. Massachusetts has a nine to thirteen member local assessment committee. MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D § 5 (West Supp. 1982). 
158. In Minnesota, there is no set number of members. The only requirement is that 
there be a balanced representation of all parties with a legitimate and direct interest in 
the outcome of the project. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115A.22 (Supp. 1982). 
159. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-127 (Supp. 1982). 
160. See infra text at notes 234-36. 
161. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-128 (Supp. 1982). 
162. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D § 5 (West Supp. 1982). 
163. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D §§ 12-13 (West Supp. 1982). 
1984] HAZARDOUS WASTE FACILITY 779 
health, safety, and environmental concerns of the host commu-
nity, and may also provide for special benefits and compensation. 
The agreement is negotiated subsequent to the approval of a 
preliminary project report, and is entered into as a non-assignable 
contract, binding upon and enforceable against the host commu-
nity.l64 
In Minnesota, a local project review committee is appointed by 
the governor for each locality designated as a candidate site by 
the state siting board.l65 Each committee exists so long as the 
location remains a candidate site, or until the facility upon the site 
commences operationYi6 Although this local project review com-
mittee does not negotiate with the facility developer for host 
community development incentives, it has many other respon-
sibilities, including informing the local community, government, 
and residents of a proposed siting; soliciting, recording and com-
municating local attitudes and concerns to the appropriate state 
agencies; and generally acting as an exchange forum between the 
community and the site approval board.167 
Thus, in different ways, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Min-
nesota provide for local committees to represent the proposed 
host community during the site review process. Composed totally 
of local representatives, the committee provides a mechanism 
through which two goals may be achieved; first, to provide for 
communication between the community and both the developer 
and the state, and, second, to provide a forum for negotiating 
agreements between the developer and the host community. In 
this way, local communities are provided a vehicle through which 
their particular concerns and needs can be addressed. 
3. Funding the Local Review 
Reviewing a hazardous waste facility proposal is costly; both 
administrative and consulting costs can be significant. In order to 
facilitate the host community's review of a siting proposal, five 
state siting statutes have provisions for technical assistance 
grants. These grants provide the community with funding for the 
independent investigation and evaluation of a site application. 
The three states with local assessment committees, Connecticut, 
164. Id. 
165. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115a.22 (Supp. 1982). 
166. Id. 
167. Id. 
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Massachusetts, and Minnesota, make specific provision for com-
mittee funding,168 while two additional states, Maine and New 
Jersey, allocate money directly to the host municipality.1OO 
The funds for Connecticut's grants are supplied by the appli-
cant upon the filing of an application.l70 The amount disbursed by 
the state siting council to the local committee is determined by 
the council. The amount awarded may not exceed $30,000171 and is 
disbursed for the sole purpose of obtaining technical assistance 
during the review process. 
The funds in Massachusetts are provided directly by the 
state.l72 The amount awarded is subject to the discretion of the 
state siting council, and is limited by the amount appropriated in 
the annual budgeU73 Awards are made both to the local assess-
ment committee of the host community, and to abutting com-
munities conducting independent reviews.174 
Minnesota's grants are awarded to the local project review 
committees.175 They enable the committees to participate in the 
site application review process and funds are earmarked for em-
ploying staff, paying administrative expenses, or contracting with 
qualified consultants.176 
The Maine siting statute provides for grants to reimburse a 
municipality for the direct costs of participating in any proceeding 
for the review of a commercial hazardous waste facility.177 The 
municipal officers would be granted intervenor status for the 
proceeding, and would be allowed to spend up to $5,000.178 
New Jersey's grant is disbursed to the host community to fund 
a statutorily mandated review.l79 The host municipality is di-
rected by statute to transmit to the state EPA the results of its 
review of the proposed facility operator.l~ These findings are used 
168. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-127 (Supp. 1982); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D § 
11 (West Supp. 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115A.22 (Supp. 1982). 
169. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38 § 1305-A(2) (Supp. 1982); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13-1E-60 
(Supp. 1982). 
170. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-127 (Supp. 1982). 
171. [d. 
172. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D § 11 (West Supp. 1982). 
173. [d. 
174. [d. 
175. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115A.22 (Supp. 1982). 
176. [d. 
177. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38 § 1305-a(2) (Supp. 1982). 
178. [d. 
179. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1E-60 (Supp. 1982). 
180. [d. 
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by the state in reviewing the site application.1s1 
In summary, technical assistance grants are provided to ease 
the proposed host community's financial burden incurred during 
the site review process. They may also be made available to 
abutting communities who also feel a need to participate in the 
technical review. By providing financial assistance to local com-
munities to conduct site proposal reviews, states may be achiev-
ing two purposes: insuring that a thorough review will be con-
ducted by those with a great interest in the merits and drawbacks 
of a proposed siting, and easing the local communities' fears that 
the state may not be providing them with all of the facts concern-
ing the potential impact of the proposed facility. In this way, some 
of the local opp)sition may be diffused. 
B. Involvement of the General Public 
In the past, some siting attempts have faced major public op-
position as a result of the mishandling of public communica-
tions.l82 It may be possible to avoid at least some of that opposition 
by providing the public with adequate information as early as 
possible in the siting process.l83 Failure to disclose relevant facts 
to the host community early in the process may breed distrust 
which can persist throughout the entire siting process.l84 Al-
though early dissemination of information is no guarantee of local 
acceptance of the project, it can contribute to public support.l85 
There is no guarantee that facility proposals will be viewed in 
any way but with mistrusU86 Informing and educating the public, 
181. Id. 
182. See Siting: A Major Problem, supra note 97. 
183. Political Issues Must Be Resolved In Siting Facilities, Conference Told [12 Curro 
Dev.] ENV'T REP. (BNA) 283 (June 26, 1981) (statement by Gary E. Koval, Manager of 
Environmental Regulatory Affairs at ARCO Petroleum Products Co.). 
184. See STATE DECISION-MAKERS GUIDE, supra note 2, at 48. 
185. The inadequate dissemination of information to the public was a major factor in 
the development of opposition to the Earthline Inc. operated landfill in Wilsonville, 
Illinois. From the beginning, Earthline failed to accurately represent its intent to 
operate a hazardous waste landfill. Instead, it listed itself as recovering, treating, storing 
and containing industrial "residues." The public learned of the true function of the 
landfill through newspaper accounts which stressed the toxicity of the wastes being 
taken to Wilsonville. Some residents confused PBB's with the now infamous chemical 
waste PCB's, and became quickly and violently opposed to the facility. It is believed that 
the fear of the unknown and lack of understanding of both the need for and function of 
the facility could have been avoided had the public been better informed from the start. 
See SITING AND PuBLIC OPPOSITION, supra note 22, at 303-16. 
186. STATE DECISION-MAKERS GmDE, supra note 2, at 48. 
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however, may help to dispel mistrust and ease the siting pro-
cess.l87 Informational/educational programs can be instituted 
using a number of vehicles, including the media, public participa-
tion, citizen advisory committees, and door to door canvassing.l88 
If the public is kept aware of the details and status of the facility 
application, confrontations and delays can be avoided and facility 
costs might be contained.l~ As a result, the constructed facility 
might be better suited to the needs of all parties than if the 
community had been left out of the siting process.loo 
Most states provide for the notification of the public of the 
receipt of a siting application.191 Although the methods of notifica-
tion vary in form, they are all designed to reach those most 
affected. Some states mandate that the chief elected official of the 
host municipality be notified by the siting council,192 He, in turn, 
would notify his constituents.193 Others direct that the siting 
council publish a notice in a newspaper of major circulation, to 
reach that portion of the public "most likely to be affected."I94 
Some statutes direct their councils to send notices directly to 
those record landowners within a specified radius of the site.1OO 
Massachusetts has incorporated a unique vehicle into its siting 
process for keeping the public informed-the public briefing ses-
sion.l96 The session serves both to provide early notification of a 
site application to the host community, and to insure that there is 
a continual dialogue with the public during the entire siting 
187.1d. 
188. [d. 
189. SITING AND PUBLIC OPPOSITION, supra note 22, at 349. 
190. See New England Facility Siting Hinges On Business, Citizens, Meeting Told [11 
Curro Dev.] ENV'T REP. (BNA) 2181 (April 3, 1981). 
191. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-119 (Supp. 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN § 403.723(1) 
(Supp. 1982); GA. CODE ANN. § 43-2909 (Supp. 1982); IND. STAT. ANN. § 13-7-8.6-6 (Supp. 
1982); RAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3433-34 (Supp. 1982); Ky. REV. STAT. § 224.855 (Supp. 1982); 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38 § 1305-A(2) (Supp. 1982); MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 3-706 
(Supp. 1982); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 13.30(19) (1980 & Supp. 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 
U5A.21 (Supp. 1982); Mo. STAT. ANN. § 260.395 (Supp.1982); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSER. LAW. 
§ 27-1105(c) (McKinney Supp. 1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130-166.18(f) (Supp.1981); OR. REV. 
STAT. § 459.550 (Chapters Replaced 1979-80). 
192. States requiring the chief elected official to be notified by the siting council 
include Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, 
Michigan, Minnesota, New York. See statutes cited supra note 191. 
193. [d. 
194. See statutes of Connecticut, Florida, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Missouri, New York, Oregon, cited supra note 191. 
195. See statutes of Maryland, Missouri, New York, cited supra note 191. 
196. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210 § 8 (West Supp. 1982). 
197. [d. at § 7. 
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process. To activate the Massachusetts siting process, a developer 
files a notice of intent with the state site safety council.I97 Within 
fifteen days of the receipt of a completed notice of intent, the site 
safety council and the Department of Environmental Quality 
Engineering determines whether the proposal is feasible and 
deserving.19B If the proposal is found to be feasible and deserving 
of state assistance, the Department of Environmental Manage-
ment (DEM) notifies the chief executive officer of every city and 
town in the Commonwealth of the scheduled briefing sessions.l99 
The number and location of the sessions, determined by the DEM, 
should provide for adequate public awareness and participation.200 
At least one briefing session outlines the siting and negotiation 
processes, and provides a forum for the developer to present his 
proposal to the public.201 All the sessions provide a reasonable 
opportunity for persons attending to comment on the proposal 
and to ask questions of the DEM and the developer.202 
The Massachusetts briefing session approach to informing and 
educating the public provides for an early and continuous flow of 
public information.203 It broadens the notice requirements so that 
a greater number of interested persons may participate and al-
lows for discussion of the siting process as well as the proposed 
facility. 
Fourteen other states provide for public participation through 
public hearings.204 Of these, Georgia is the only state that requires 
that a specific number of persons, twenty-five, from the potential 
site community make a request for a public hearing before it will 
schedule one.205 All other states mandate that at least one such 
hearing be held in the affected locality within a specified period of 
time after the receipt of a site application. The hearings allow for 
198. [d. 
199. [d. 
200. [d. 
201. [d. 
202. [d. 
203. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210 § 8 (West Supp. 1982). 
204. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-119 (Supp.1982); GA. CODE ANN. § 43-2907 (Supp. 
1982); ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 111.5 § 1039.1(d) (Supp. 1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3434(d)(1) 
(Supp. 1982); Ky. REV. STAT. § 224.855 (Supp. 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38 
§ 1305-A(2) (Supp. 1982); MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 3-706 (Supp. 1982); MICH. STAT. 
ANN. § 13.30(20) (1980 & Supp. 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115A.21 (Supp. 1982); Mo. STAT. 
ANN. § 260.395 (Supp. 1982); NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-1521.02 (Supp. 1980); N.Y. ENVTL. 
CONSER. LAW § 27-1105 (McKinney Supp. 1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130-166.17B (Supp. 
1981); and OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3734.05 (Page Supp. 1982). 
205. GA. CODE ANN. § 43-2907 (Supp. 1982). 
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presentations, comments, and questions, and result in a written 
public record of all testimony, both written and oral.206 This record 
is "considered" during the evaluation of the site proposal in most 
states.:W7 One state expands the potential utility of the record by 
requiring that it be adequate to form the basis of appeal of a siting 
decision,:W8 and another requires that the record be sent to the 
governor with a recommendation for approval or disapproval of 
the siting application.209 
On the whole, these hearings provide a public forum for express-
ing local opinions for and against the proposed site. They are 
broad in scope and are open to all interested persons. They may 
thus help to minimize local opposition by providing a forum for 
the expression of the fears and concerns of the community. 
C. Host Community Negotiations for Mitigation Measures and 
Incentive Compensation 
Since successful siting of a hazardous waste management facil-
ity may depend upon making the facility acceptable to its neigh-
bors,210 facility sponsors must sometimes "negotiate" with com-
munity members to win their approval. Several states have estab-
lished procedural vehicles for negotiation between the facility 
sponsor and the host community. These negotiations may provide 
for either the mitigation of the effects of a facility siting,211 or the 
award of incentive compensation for those effects which cannot 
be mitigated.212 
Mitigation measures vary. They can include the alteration of a 
facility design, the modification of operating or management pro-
cesses, and/or the monitoring of the local environment for con-
tamination.213 Monitoring may be an especially effective mitiga-
206. See SITING AND PuBUC OPPOSITION, 8upra note 22, at 17-18. 
207. See supra note 204. 
208. IlL. STAT. ANN. ch. 111.5 § 1039.1(d) (Supp. 1982). 
209. N.C. GEN STAT. § 130-16617B (Supp. 1981). 
210. See O'Hare, 8upra note 120, at 416. 
211. The effects which may concern communities include: aesthetics; noise; traffic; 
local service and infrastructure burdens; perceived quality of life; community character; 
health risks from water contamination or fumes; odors; and environmental damage, 
particularly from runoff. CLARK-McGLENNON AsSOCIATES, NEGOTIATING TO PROTECT 
YOUR INTERESTS: A HANDBOOK ON SITING ACCEPTABLE HAZARDOUS WASTE 
FACILITIES IN NEW ENGLAND 8 (1980). 
212. See Hazardous Waste Management in Massachusetts, supra note 43, at 4.7. 
213. For example, in a siting attempt in Maryland by Allied Chemical Co., a commu-
nity negotiated for several mitigation measures. These included an adjustment to haul-
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tion measure because it provides direct data on the presence or 
absence of danger from the hazardous wastes. 
Incentive compensation is the provision of side benefits, which 
may be unrelated to the function or nature of a facility. These 
benefits are generally awarded by the facility sponsor to the host 
community for the acceptance of what that community regards as 
its disproportionate share of the risks associated with hazardous 
waste management. They may thus serve to quiet opposition and 
generate support.214 
There are two kinds of incentive compensation: direct payments 
and indirect payments.215 Direct payment incentives are cash 
payments to abutting landowners who suffer diminished property 
values, other especially affected individuals, or the community as 
a whole.216 They include217 the receipt of taxes on facility revenues; 
payments to the local government in lieu of taxes; "tipping fees" 
based upon the amount of waste accepted by the facility; the 
payment of any additional cost borne by the community, such as 
upgrading roads, providing special training or equipment to the 
fire department,218 or the periodic monitoring of the community;219 
ing hours in response to a traffic concern; the reduction of airborn toxic dust from trucks 
by the use of covers; and the provision of a management role for a public agency to offset 
facility operation concern. 
In a siting of a hazardous waste landfill in Missouri, the mitigation agreement in-
cluded payment for monitoring an adjacent creek and the posting of a $75,000 bond as a 
guarantee against leaching into a local lake. CLARK-McGLENNON ASSOCIATES, supra 
note 199, at 28. 
214. Those communities which may deserve compensation are those where the facility 
is localized while the benefits are widely distributed over a broad region, or where the 
facility is perceived as locally noxious and is big enough that it displaces existing or 
potential uses of the site. O'Hare, supra note 120, at 409. 
215. EPA Hazardous Waste Siti ng Committee to Provide Assistance, Develop Policy [11 
Curro Dev.] ENV'T REP. (BNA) 273 (June 20, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Committee to 
Provide Assistance, Develop Policy]. 
216. ld. 
217. ld.; Siting: A Major Problem, supra note 97, at 874; Hazardous Waste Manage-
ment in Massachusetts, supra note 43, at 4.7-4.8. 
218. For example, for the two Wes-Con Inc. facilities located in Idaho, a fire truck is 
available on-site in case of fire, and the company supports the local fire fighting efforts 
with personnel and with equipment. See SITING AND PUBUC OPPOSITION, supra note 22, 
at 144-56. 
219. When an operating hazardous waste facility owned by SCA Services in Model 
City, New York was being challenged as a source of contamination for a nearby creek, 
consultants for the company offered reports that its discharged effluent would have no 
damaging effect upon the fish in the creek since results of its monitoring showed the lack 
of a toxic material build-up. The local residents challenged the company's ability to 
monitor its discharges, so the company offered to pay the town to hire an agency to 
provide 24-hour surveillance over the discharge operations of the plant. ld. at 256-79. 
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the payment of anticipated cost increases in fire prevention, pub-
lic works, or public safety; the establishment of a trust fund, 
supported by developer and/or generator contributions, for the 
guarantee of property values along specified transportation 
routes; and one-time lump payments to residents or the local 
government.220 
Indirect payment incentives are far more common than direct 
payments. They include the purchase of buffer zones or develop-
ment rights to adjacent lands; the provision of lands, funds, tech-
nical assistance or other services to help communities develop 
cultural or other facilities;221 the provision of funds for community 
development, including landscaping, earth berms, streetscaping, 
signs and lighting; the limitation of hours of operation; the rerout-
ing of traffic generated by the facility; the provision of transporta-
tion related services such as snow plowing and road salt storage; 
the free use of the facility for local businesses; the provision of 
additional safety precautions; the cleanup and rehabilitation of 
abandoned waste dump sites; and the purchase of local bonds at 
favorable prices for the locality.222 
Despite the fact that 3M's reputation in the Cottage Grove Community of Minnesota is 
that of a competent, responsible firm that will be there long after its landfill site is filled, 
the town still required that the 3M Company pay for periodic studies to ensure that the 
groundwater would not be contaminated. [d. at 11(}'19. 
220. Residents of Bordentown, New Jersey were fearful of the general economic 
disadvantages that would accrue to their area if SCA Services, one of the largest waste 
services companies in the nation, was allowed to locate a small commercial landfill for 
the disposal of hazardous wastes. Although the company offered to establish a 
"perpetual-care" fund from the profits of Earthline, the subsidiary of SCA Services, the 
residents rejected the offer, stating that the fund could never compensate for the risks to 
the health and welfare of hundreds of thousands of people. [d. at 157-75. 
When Wilsonville, Illinois town officials challenged the technical suitability of an 
Earthline Inc. operated landfill by bringing suit, the corporation tried to settle the 
lawsuit out of court by offering to settle any outstanding damage claims by residents 
against Earthline, in addition to paving the main street which was used by its trucks to 
bring in hazardous wastes. Because opposition was so strong, the offer was refused. 
Illinois EPA officials, however, along with the State Attorney General's Office, had felt 
that residents would not have been so staunchly opposed to the facility if Earthline had 
offered them some form of financial stake in the facility at the time of its inception. [d. at 
303-16. 
221. Opposition was so strong to Allied Chemical Corporation's proposed landfill in 
Rossville, Maryland that Allied could not even interest the community in the develop-
ment of a park. The residents had adequate backyards and were more interested in 
upgrading their community image than in being known as Baltimore's dumping 
grounds. SITING AND PuBUC OPPOSITION, supra note 22, at 176-89. 
222. Committee to Provide Assistance, Develop Policy, supra note 215, at 273; Siting: A 
Major Problem, supra note 97, at 874; Hazardous Waste Management in Massachusetts, 
supra note 43, at 4.7-4.8. 
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Who. shall receive incentives may depend O.n who. bears the CO.sts 
assO.ciated with the facility.223 If the effects O.fthe site cO.nstructiO.n 
and O.peratiO.n are felt O.nly by thO.se landO.wners adjacent to' the 
facility, then they alO.ne may be cO.mpensated.224 If the cO.mmunity 
as a whO.le is affected, then cO.mpensatiO.n will be fO.rmulated to' 
meet cO.mmunity needs.225 
MO.st direct and indirect incentives are prO.vided by the facility 
O.peratO.r.226 SO.me direct incentives may be designed, hO.wever, to' 
be paid nO.t by the facility O.peratO.r, but by the hazardO.us waste 
generatO.r who. is 100cated O.utside the cO.mmunity. MO.nies paid by 
this generatO.r, called bO.nuses, are assessed O.n a dO.llar per tO.n O.f 
waste basis.227 These bO.nuses may make the hO.st cO.mmunity 
mO.re receptive to' the siting O.f the facility,228 and to' the receipt O.f 
wastes frO.m O.ther cO.mmunities. 
ThrO.ugh their siting statutes, states can play a rO.le in the 
prO.visiO.n O.f incentives O.r the mitigatiO.n O.f harm assO.ciated with a 
facility siting. FO.r example, the state can prO.vide direct incentives 
to' make the hO.st cO.mmunity mO.re accepting O.f a facility.229 It can 
do. so. by O.ffering a greater share O.f state funds fO.r parks, high-
ways, pO.lice, O.r educatiO.n. It can also. pass a law making "bonus" 
payments mandato'ry fO.r all fO.reign wastes prO.cessed O.r stO.red.230 
223. Clark-McGlennon Associates, supra note 211, at 34. 
224. [d. 
225. [d. 
226. When Boston Edison sited its first nuclear plant in Plymouth, Massachusetts, the 
resulting direct compensation to the town was the doubling of its tax base. The town's 
indirect compensation included a $300,000 recreation center, public access to a nearby 
breakwater, a footbridge to a more distant area for fishing, and comfort stations and 
shelters. 
Wes-Con Company provided the following compensation as incentive for its Idaho 
facility: the donation of salvage from its site to the town; an offer to loan mechanical 
equipment to local farmers; town use of the Company's fire engine; hazardous waste first 
aid classes for local doctors and residents; and the creation of a local corporation with 
local owners to run Wes-Con. CLARK-McGLENNON AsSOCIATES, supra note 211, at 30. 
227. SITING AND PuBUC OPPOSITION, supra note 22, at 348. 
228. [d. 
229. Committee to Provide Assistance, Develop Policy, supra note 215, at 273. 
230. Despite the fact that fourteen states currently collect fees from the facility 
(Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, 
New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Washington), only three-New Jersey, 
Maine, and Indiana-route the funds directly to the municipality. All others maintain 
state accounts for various hazardous waste related purposes. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 36-2805 (Supp. 1982); CA. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 25149.5 (Supp. 1982); 1981 
Conn. Pub. Acts 81-369; FLA STAT. ANN. § 403.722(8) (Supp. 1982); ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 
111.5 § 1022.2 (Supp. 1982); IND. STAT. ANN. § 13-7-8.6-11 (Supp. 1982); Ky. REV. STAT. 
§ 224.876 (Supp. 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38 § 1305-A-3 (Supp. 1982); MICH. STAT. 
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Utah has a unique method of making a host community more 
accepting of a facility through a provision in its siting statute 
which addresses the mitigation of damage. It provides a specific 
remedy for those individuals whose property has been devalued 
by the approval of a facility proposal.231 Any owner or user of 
property affected by the approval is authorized to bring action in 
a district court against the facility owner for compensation for the 
"devaluation of or interference with" the property rights. 2:32 
Whether a facility becomes more acceptable to a host commu-
nity because of mitigation measures or incentive compensation 
payments, the determination of what specifically would satisfy 
that host is generally made during negotiations between the host 
community and the facility sponsor. Connecticut and Massachu-
setts are the only states which require such negotiations.233 
In Connecticut, compensation for the acceptance of a facility 
takes the form of either indirect incentives, negotiated for be-
tween the local assessment committee and the facility applicant, 
or monetary payments.234 The monetary payments are assessed 
either as a dollar amount per gallon of waste deposited, or a 
percentage of the facility's gross receipts.235 At the outset, the 
community chooses between the two options.236 
In Massachusetts, the local assessment committee negotiates 
with the facility sponsor for compensatory incentives.237 In addi-
tion, the design, construction, operation and maintenance of the 
facility, as well as health and environmental concerns, are ad-
dressed at siting negotiations.238 Terms that are agreed upon 
during negotiations are incorporated into a siting agreement, 
binding upon the parties. The siting agreement must be entered 
into before final approval can be awarded to the facility.239 
Negotiations can potentially guarantee that the concerns of 
both the community and the sponsor will be aired. They also 
ANN. § 13:30(42) (1980 & Supp. 1982); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1E-80 (Supp. 1982); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 130-166.18(6) (Supp. 1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3734.18 (Page Supp. 1982); OR. 
REV. STAT. § 459.610 (Chapters Replaced 1979-80); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.105.040 
(Supp. 1982). 
231. UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-14a-7 (Supp. 1981). 
232. [d. 
233. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-127 (Supp. 1982). 
234. [d. 
235. [d. 
236. [d. 
237. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D § 12 (West Supp. 1982). 
238. [d. 
239. [d. 
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provide a forum for taking steps to reduce risks and impacts to 
acceptable levels, and obtaining community acceptance through 
direct and indirect payments. They may also ease the siting pro-
cess by demonstrating a sponsor's good faith.240 By requiring 
negotiations, Massachusetts and Connecticut have taken steps to 
obtain community acceptance by providing the host community 
with a guaranteed forum for airing its concerns and obtaining 
compensation in return for its cooperation. The Utah siting stat-
ute might also diffuse local opposition by allowing landowners 
access to the courts to obtain compensation for the devaluation of 
their property resulting from a facility siting. 
D. State Preemption of Local Powers 
When all else fails in gaining host community acceptance of the 
siting of a hazardous waste management facility, a state may 
need to resort to a form of preemption of local powers. Preemption 
may be directed at local land use laws, local hazardous waste 
management laws, or laws limiting or prohibiting the transporta-
tion or hazardous waste. In addition, because a facility siting 
could be effectively blocked by a landowner's refusal to sell the 
desired site, some statutes also give the state the authority to 
exercise its eminent domain powers to acquire a facility site. 
Although the exercise of preemption or eminent domain author-
ity by the state may incur further hostility from the potential site 
community, such action may be the only alternative to abandon-
ing a necessary siting in an otherwise suitable location. 
1. Preemption of Local Land Use Laws 
Prior to the enactment of RCRA, federal and state govern-
ments deferred to local land use laws in siting waste facilities.241 
Local zoning and building codes gave localities the final say on 
where a facility would be located. When RCRA created the "ex-
plosive demand"242 for new hazardous waste management 
240. During the siting of an on-site landfill at Monsanto Industrial Chemical Com-
pany's plant near Bridgeport, New Jersey, negotiations between the company and 
various agencies led to facility design changes. This demonstrated to the residents the 
company's ability both to work with local environmentalists, and to respond to com-
plaints from the community, giving a general impression to local residents that Mon-
santo was receptive to local concerns. SITING AND PuBLIC OPPOSITION, supra note 22, at 
35-45. 
241. Wolf, supra note 16, at 490. 
242. Id. 
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facilities, this deference abated as state and federal involvement 
in the siting process increased.243 By enacting preemption provi-
sions, some states have clearly recognized that local land use and 
zoning laws could be effectively used by host communities to block 
proposed sitings.244 
Despite this fact, one state, California,245 continues to defer to all 
local land use requirements during its site approval process. It 
does so despite a noted imbalance between existing hazardous 
waste facilities and those which are needed.246 Its siting statute 
goes so far as to explicitly state that local land use regulation of 
existing facilities may not be preempted.247 As a consequence, 
California's siting process is fragmented and laborious. Multiple 
permits from state and local agencies are required, as are notice 
and comment for each permit issuance.24s The resulting adminis-
trative complexity is exemplified by the need in Los Angeles 
County for the approval of twenty-six government bodies.249 
Connecticut's siting law represents the "simultaneous consid-
eration" approach.250 Its override provision grants jurisdiction 
over the siting procedure to the state hazardous waste council, 
but stipulates that consideration be given to those local laws, 
ordinances, and regulations "as it deems appropriate."251 In Con-
necticut, the proposed facility operator applies for all required 
permits concurrently when it applies to the council for approva1.252 
Each permit refusal is appealable to the Council which has exclu-
sive jurisdiction over the subject matter. The Council may affirm, 
modify, or revoke the decision of any other governmental body, 
and substitute its own decision upon the vote of a two-thirds 
243. Id. 
244. See supra text and note at note 32. 
245. CA. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 25147 (Supp. 1982). 
246. Id. at § 25146. 
247. Id. at § 25147. The statute states that "no provision in this chapter shall limit the 
authority of any state or local agency in the enforcement or administration of any 
provision ofJaw which it is specifically permitted or required to enforce and administer." 
248. Id. at § 25149. 
249. Industry Ponders Opposition, Future Of New Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites [11 
Curro Dev.] ENV'T REP. (BNA) 2150 (March 27, 1981). 
250. Other states with a simultaneous consideration approach, but without an appeal 
provision like Connecticut's, include: Indiana, IND. STAT. ANN. § 13-7-8.6-10(4) (Supp. 
1982); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3434 (Supp. 1982); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
38 § 1305-A (Supp.1982); and Michigan, MICH. STAT. ANN. § 13.30(20) (1980 & Supp. 1982). 
251. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN § 22a-124 (Supp. 1982). 
252. The Council itself issues a certificate of public safety and need when a permit is 
granted. CONN. GEN STAT. ANN § 22a-124(a), -54. 
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majority. Since the Council's membership is limited to one-third 
local representation,253 local participation is provided, but local 
control is effectively foreclosed.2M 
A different approach to overriding local land use control in 
facility siting is operative in Florida. There is no preemption 
provision, but, upon the determination of both the Governor and 
the Cabinet, a variance to any local land use law can be granted.255 
The local government having jurisdiction over the site locale 
assesses the compliance of the facility with local land use laws.256 
If the facility is found not to be in compliance, the applicant may 
apply directly to that same authority for a variance. If the request 
is denied, and if a majority of the area's regional planning council 
has recommended a variance, the applicant may petition the 
Governor and the Cabinet for a variance,257 which will be granted 
if a clear and convincing need for the facility is established.258 New 
York's override of local land use laws applies only to those zoning 
and land use regulations promulgated after the date of facility 
permit application.259 Those laws and regulations in force on the 
date of application may be used to block a facility siting, and no 
mechanism for obtaining an appeal or variance is provided.260 
Similarly, Massachusetts' hazardous waste facility siting laws 
serve to "freeze" zoning activity once an application has been 
filed, rather than preempt all local zoning contro1.261 Construction 
permits for hazardous waste storage, treatment, or disposal 
253. State Board Will Be Able To Override Zoning Objections To Toxic Waste Sites [11 
Curro Dev.] ENV'T REP. (BNA) 244 (June 13, 1980). 
254. Millstone, Developments in Connecticut Environmental Law: 1980, 55 CONN. BAR 
J. 142, 146 (1981). 
255. Minnesota also provides a review to determine the reasonableness of require-
ments imposed by a political subdivision. It is conducted by the Pollution Control 
Agency, which has the power to approve, disapprove, suspend, modify, or reverse any 
requirements imposed by a political subdivision. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115A.28 (Supp. 
1982). North Carolina's review of a county, municipal, or other local ordinance affecting 
siting is activated by the petition of the proposed facility sponsor. The review is per-
formed by the board, which then recommends either approval or disapproval to the 
Governor, who makes the final decision. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130-166.17B (Supp. 1981). 
256. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.723(2) (Supp. 1982). 
257. Id. at § 403.723(4) -.723(5). 
258. Id. at § 403.723(7Xc). 
259. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSER. LAW § 27-1105(f) (McKinney Supp. 1982). 
260. Id. 
261. Minnesota provides a similar provision in its siting statute. In order to permit 
comparative evaluation of sites, however, a moratorium is imposed on all development 
within candidate sites and buffer areas until six months following final action of the 
board. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115A.21 (Supp. 1982). 
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facilities are issued by the state "as a right" if the site is zoned for 
industrial use at the time a notice of intent is filed by the facility 
applicant.262 A city or town cannot subsequently adopt zoning 
changes to exclude a proposed facility from its community.263 The 
law does not, however, prevent changes following the disallowal of 
a permit. Hence, after a developer is denied a facility construction 
permit for a specific locus, the city or town may adopt and enforce 
a zoning ordinance which would exclude similar facilities from 
that area in the future. 
New Jersey and Maryland provide blanket override provisions 
in their state siting statutes. In New Jersey,264 once the registra-
tion statement and engineering design have been granted state 
departmental approval, no further approval is required.265 In 
Maryland, the site, design, construction, and operation of a facil-
ity are exempt from any local regulation once a certificate of 
public necessity is issued.266 
These states have all adopted different approaches to resolving 
conflicts between state hazardous waste facility siting policies 
and local land use laws. From the California statute, which 
explicitly integrates local land use laws into the siting process, to 
the New Jersey and Maryland statutes, which preempt local laws 
entirely, varying degrees of deference are granted to the host 
community. Obviously, "forcing" a facility on a community 
against its will is bound to generate significant local hostility. On 
the other hand, effective use of local laws can stymie state siting 
policies entirely. The balance struck between these two consid-
erations will likely depend on the different policies and political 
situations of each state. 
2. Preemption of Local Hazardous Waste Laws 
In addition to preempting local land use laws, some states have 
specifically denied local governments the right to prohibit or un-
duly restrict by local laws the construction or modification of a 
262. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40A § 9 (West Supp. 1982). 
263. [d. 
264. N.J. STAT. Al\:N. § 13:1E-63 (Supp. 1982). 
265. Ohio also provides that the application for site approval is subject only to the 
requirements of the siting act. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3734.05 (Page Supp. 1982). 
266. MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 3-705 (Supp. 1982). Illinois simply states that local 
zoning or other land use requirements are not applicable. ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 111.5 
§ 1039.1(0 (Supp. 1982). Utah states that the site is not required to conform to any local 
zoning or other land use regulation, law, or ordinance. UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-14a-8 
--------------
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facility, and the treatment, storage or disposal of hazardous waste 
at a facility within its jurisdiction.267 Most states approach this 
area by proscribing local laws which prohibit or restrict the con-
struction or operation of a hazardous waste facility.268 
Indiana's siting statute, for example, states that no local gov-
ernment shall "prohibit or unduly restrict" hazardous waste 
management at a facility within its jurisdiction.269 Kansas' statute 
preempts local laws which prohibit the construction or modifica-
tion of a hazardous waste facility by "ordinances, permit re-
quirements or other requirements."27o Maryland's statute 
exempts "the site, the design, construction and operation of 
facilities on the site" from all local laws once the site has been 
issued a certificate of public necessity.271 The New York statute 
prohibits any municipality from making any requirements "re-
garding the operation of a facility."272 Ohio's statute prohibits any 
political subdivision from requiring, in addition to compliance 
with state laws, any "other conditions for the construction or 
operation of a ... facility" and from adopting or enforcing any 
laws which alter, impair, or limit the authority granted in the 
facility permit.273 
Not all siting statutes prohibit local regulation of hazardous 
waste facilities entirely. One state, Maine, permits some local 
involvement. Communities may adopt and enforce hazardous 
waste ordinances provided that they are less stringent than the 
state standards.274 Thus, the Maine provision may effectively 
serve as a two-prong attack on local opposition to facility siting: it 
could diffuse opposition by permitting some local role in waste 
management, while at the same time insuring that state policies 
and siting efforts are not derailed by host communities. 
(Supp. 1981). Washington requires that sites comply with local comprehensive land use 
plans approved prior to January 1, 1976. It provides that no lands shall be subject to any 
other local land use regulations. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 70.105.040 (Supp. 1982). 
267. See IND. STAT. ANN. § 13-7-8.6-13 (Supp. 1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3436 (Supp. 
1982); MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 3-705 (Supp. 1982); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSER. LAW 
§ 27-1107 (Mc ~nney Supp. 1982); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 3734.05 (Page Supp. 1982). 
268. Id. 
269. IND. STAT. ANN. § 13-7-8.6-13 (Supp. 1982). 
270. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3436 (Supp. 1982). 
271. MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 3-705 (Supp. 1982). 
272. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSER. LAW § 27-1107 (McKinney Supp. 1982). 
273. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3734.05 (Page Supp. 1982). 
274. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38 § 1310-A (Supp. 1982). 
794 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 11:755 
3. Proscription Against Interference by Transportation 
Regulations 
Some communities have taken a more subtle approach than 
land use and waste management restrictions to block the siting of 
hazardous waste facilities. These communities have restricted 
road use and imposed weight limits on potential facility access 
roads.275 Because such restrictions effectively prevent siting, some 
state statutes proscribe the promulgation and enforcement of 
local laws which interfere with the transportation of hazardous 
wastes to a facility.276 
The Indiana statute, for example, prohibits the promulgation of 
local rules and regulations, by any locality, which place undue 
restrictions on the transportation of hazardous waste "through 
its area of jurisdiction ... en route to a facility."277 The Kansas 
statute simply proscribes local ordinances from "restrict[ing] 
transportation to the facility."278 Maryland enacted a statute 
which states that the issuance of a certificate of public necessity 
exempts "the transportation of hazardous ... waste to and from 
the facilities on the site" from all political subdivision laws.279 
Utah's statute proscribes all local governments from prohibiting 
or unduly restricting "the transportation of hazardous waste 
through the governmental unit to an approved ... facility."2ffi 
Like preemption provisions which address local land use and 
hazardous waste management laws, siting statute provisions 
which preempt local waste transportation laws may also effec-
tively eviscerate local control over facility sitings. Even a siting 
statute which includes all three preemption provisions, however, 
does not guarantee state success in siting a hazardous waste 
facility. Local control can still be exercised through a landowner's 
refusal to sell the target site. 
275. See Bacow, Overcoming Local Opposition to Hazardous Waste Facilities: The 
Massachusetts Approach, 6 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 265, 273 (1982). 
276. See IND. STAT. ANN. § 13-7-8.6-13 (Supp. 1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3436 (Supp. 
1982); MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 3-705 (Supp. 1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-14a-8 (Supp. 
1981). 
277. IND. STAT. ANN. § 13-7-8.6-13 (Supp. 1982). 
278. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3436 (Supp. 1982). 
279. MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 3-705 (Supp. 1982). 
280. UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-14a-8 (Supp. 1981). 
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4. Use of the Eminent Domain Power 
Even when local legislative opposition is anticipated and effec-
tively countered by preemption provisions, opposition could 
triumph in another way. Facility opponents could apply pressure 
sufficient to force the landowner to withdraw the parcel as a 
potential site.281 
To counter this tactic, some state siting statutes provide that 
the state's eminent domain power-the taking of private property 
by the state or other public representative for public use282-can 
be exercised to acquire land suitable for a hazardous waste facil-
ity site.2~ Those states authorizing this procedure do not neces-
sarily do so to acquire ownership,284 but rather, to obtain the right 
to lease, sell or otherwise convey the property to the facility 
operator. 
Siting statutes which provide for the exercise of the eminent 
domain power do so in a variety of ways. In Arizona, the Director 
of the Department of Health Services may obtain lands for 
hazardous waste facility siting by "condemnation."285 In Iowa, it is 
the hazardous waste commission which may recommend to the 
Executive Council the condemnation of land for a facility.286 A 
developer in Massachusetts may petition the state for the exer-
cise of its eminent domain authority if all permits and licenses 
have been issued and the siting agreement has been estab-
lished.287 In Minnesota, the siting board may direct the Commis-
281. The opposition of Westford, Massachusetts residents to a siting was so strong 
that they threatened to rezone a local granite quarry for residential use if the quarry's 
owner continued to offer the locus as a potential site. The threat may have been illegal, 
but since the owner's family had lived in the town since the 17th century, the owner 
preferred "to settle the issue by cooperation rather than by confrontation," and with-
drew the parcel from consideration. Butterfield, supra note 114, at 1, col. 5. 
282. Eminent domain is the power to take property for a public or semipublic use. This 
power is an inherent right of sovereignty of a municipality, a state, or a nation and may 
be conferred on non-sovereign entities by legislation. D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING 
AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW 310-11 (1975); 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 
529 (A.J. Casner ed. 1974). 
283. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-28027 (Supp. 1982); IOWA CODE ANN. § 455B.141 
(Supp. 1982); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D § 17 (West Supp. 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 
115A.06 (Supp. 1982); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1E-81 (Supp. 1982); OR. REV. STAT. § 459.595 
(Chapters Replaced 1979-80); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-14b-6 (Supp. 1981). 
284. Only three states require ownership of the fee simple by the facility owner. See 
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2801 (Supp.1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130-166.17A(Supp.1981); 
and OR. REV. STAT. § 459.590 (Chapters Replaced 1979-80). 
285. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-28027 (Supp. 1982). 
286. IOWA CODE ANN. § 455B.141 (Supp. 1982). 
287. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D § 17 (West Supp. 1982). 
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sioner of Administration to acquire, by condemnation, sites and 
buffer areas.288 In New Jersey, the hazardous waste commission 
may acquire by eminent domain any land "reasonably necessary" 
for a hazardous waste facility.2!1l In Oregon, the hazardous waste 
commission may acquire real property for the disposal of hazard-
ous wastes by instituting condemnation proceedings,290 and in 
Utah, the hazardous waste authority is authorized to acquire 
sites sufficient in number to meet the needs of the state by 
exercise of "eminent domain."291 
The ability of host communities to prevent facility sitings by 
withholding target sites is effectively foreclosed. Combined with 
the enactment of the preemption provisions discussed above, local 
control of facility sitings is precluded. This article will now offer an 
examination of those hazardous waste facility siting statute pro-
visions which appear to most effectively ease the siting process. 
VI. RECOMMENDED PROVISIONS FOR A SITING STATUTE 
In the past, public opposition frustrated many hazardous waste 
facility siting attempts.292 As a result, state siting statutes were 
enacted containing provisions which had one of two goals: taking 
away local veto power over proposed sitings, or diffusing opposi-
tion by providing for local participation in the siting process. This 
section offers a review of those provisions which would appear to 
most effectively insure state success in siting waste facilities. The 
specific provisions recommended are composites of those cur-
rently in use, as described in the preceding section, and were 
chosen based upon their potential to contribute to the attainment 
of one of the two aforementioned goals. 
It should be stated at the outset that few states will adopt 
entirely both goals. Depending on the unique calculus of policy 
and politics out of which each state will formulate its own siting 
policies, these two goals will be adopted in varying degrees. Some 
states may wish to follow the California model and provide for 
complete deference to local laws.293 Other states may reject the 
288. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115A.06 (Supp. 1982). 
289. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1E-81 (Supp. 1982). 
290. OR. REV. STAT. § 459.595 (Chapters Replaced 1979-80). 
291. UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-14b-6 (Supp. 1981). 
292. See supra text and notes at notes 29-33, 114-32. 
293. See 8upra text and notes at notes 245-49. 
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proposition that providing for local participation in the siting 
process diffuses community opposition.294 In addition, there are 
other policy considerations not discussed herein which will affect 
the type of siting statute adopted by many states. The type of 
local participation which the state believes would give com-
munities their most effective role, the degree to which it is be-
lieved that equity dictates local control, and other considerations 
will all play a role. The provisions outlined below are offered 
because they appear to best maximize local participation and 
state control. In this sense, this section does not provide the basis 
for a "model" siting act, but offers a survey of the types of siting 
statute provisions which should be considered by states which 
have adopted these two goals. 
A. The Elimination of Local Veto Power 
Although some provisions may help to diffuse local opposition to 
a facility siting by providing channels for local participation, they 
cannot necessarily counter the exclusion of facilities through local 
land use, waste management, and transportation laws. Thus, the 
following provisions should be considered to eliminate local con-
trol over facility siting. 
1. The state siting board should have the authority to affirm, 
modify, or revoke the application of local land use regulations to the 
proposed facility site. Under this approach, adopted by the Con-
necticut statute,295 local land use regulations would be given con-
sideration by the state board. Exclusion of a proposed facility by 
local land use law, however, would not result in immediate rejec-
tion of the proposal, as is the case in California where all local land 
use regulations must be complied with. 296 Rather the state board 
would have final say over the applicability of local land use laws. 
Unlike the New Jersey and Maryland statutes,297 however, which 
completely override local land use laws, this provision would at 
least allow local entities an opportunity to make a case before the 
state board for deference to their laws. 
2. Municipalities should be able to enact ordinances addressing 
the construction and generation of hazardous waste facilities pr·o-
vided they are not more stringent than those of the state. Like the 
294. See supra text and notes at notes 264-66. 
295. See supra text and notes at notes 250-54. 
296. See supra text and note at note 245. 
297. See supra text and notes at notes 264-66. 
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Maine statute,298 this provision does not deny local governments 
the right to legislate with regard to the construction or modifica-
tion of a facility, or the treatment, storage, or disposal of hazard-
ous waste at a facility, as provided by the statutes of a number of 
states.299 Rather, it permits a local government to adopt and en-
force control and abatement ordinances that are less stringent 
than state laws. By so doing, the provision allows the siting board 
to incorporate in its siting agreement with the facility sponsor all 
applicable local requirements to the fullest extent practicable. 
This provision might result in the siting and operation of facilities 
which would be less offensive to host communities than if local 
laws were preempted entirely. 
3. Local governments should not be allowed to prohibit or unduly 
restrict the transportation of hazardous waste treatment, storage 
or disposal facilities. Since local laws can impose weight limits on 
facility access roads and otherwise limit road use, thereby effec-
tively blocking the siting of an otherwise technically acceptable 
hazardous waste facility, such restrictions would be proscribed, as 
provided by the statutes of Indiana, Kansas, Maryland and 
Utah.300 
4. The state hazardous waste commission should be able to ac-
quire real property for the siting of hazardous waste facilities by 
the exercise of its eminent domain authority. The state commis-
sion would be able to lease, sell, or otherwise convey property 
acquired by eminent domain to the facility operator for develop-
ment. The eminent domain authority would not be exercised in 
every case, but only where necessary to acquire a desired site 
withheld by the owner. 
B. The Provision for Local Involvement to Diffuse Opposition 
The following provisions provide the potential host community 
with channels through which to participate in the siting process. 
This participation is designed to minimize local opposition in sev-
eral ways. First, it is designed to reduce a community's fears of 
the potential dangers of living near a hazardous waste facility by 
increasing the flow of information to local residents. Second, it 
should make the community feel less that the facility is being 
forced upon them. Third, it should provide them with avenues 
298. See supra text and note at note 274. 
299. See supra test and note at note 267. 
300. See supra text and notes at notes 275-80. 
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through which they can express their concerns. Fourth, it should 
provide a forum for negotiation between the community and 
facility sponsor, and fifth, it should help allay their fears by pro-
viding them with the means to conduct their own independent 
review of the proposal. 
1. A state hazardous waste siting board, which would include ad 
hoc local representatives, should be impaneled as the permit grant-
ing authority for all facility sitings within the state. This board, 
which should be separate from the state hazardous waste man-
agement council, would add an air of legitimacy and objectivity to 
the site selection process, by assuring the public of an extensive 
technical review of site applications, and by providing for a local 
voice in the site selection process through local representation on 
the board. 
The state siting board would review and rule upon all facility 
proposals, whether they originated with the state or with the 
proposed facility operator. To provide the greatest variety of ad-
ministrative, policy, and technical perspectives, a model board 
would include all types of representatives which serve on twelve 
state siting boards now in place.301 This board would be composed 
of representatives from all state agencies having authority over 
environmental conservation,302 public health,303 safety,304 com-
merce,305 and transportation;306 a professional hydrogeologist;307 a 
professional chemical engineer;308 and representatives from in-
dustry, including industries which use on-site facilities for hazard-
ous waste management,309industries which use off-site facilities,310 
organizations licensed to operate off-site hazardous waste 
facilities,311 and industries that transport hazardous wastes.312 
With membership extending across agency lines, the board would 
have a broader administrative perspective than the permit re-
301. See supra note 139. 
302. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3432 (Supp. 1982). 
303.Id. 
304. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D § 4 (West Supp. 1982). 
305. See, e.g., N.Y. ENVTL CONSER. LAW § 27-1105(d) (McKinney Supp. 1982). 
306. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3432 (Supp. 1982). 
307. See, e.g., IND. STAT. ANN. § 13-7-8.6-3 (Supp. 1982). 
308. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 21D § 4 (West Supp. 1982). 
309. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.729 (Supp. 1982). 
310. Id. 
311. Id. 
312. Id. 
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view structures now existing within the individual agencies.3l3 
The inclusion of knowledgeable representatives from hazardous 
waste management industries would give the board a unique 
technical and commercial perspective, and an objective scientific 
perspective would be provided by the chemical engineer and hy-
drogeologist. 
Although the board would review site applications as they are 
received from proposed facility operators, it could also perform the 
broader responsibility of site planning for the state as do the 
boards of New Jersey, Minnesota and Maryland.314 The board 
would assess the present and future hazardous waste output of 
industry, compare it to the management capabilities of existing 
facilities, and plan for the siting of additionally needed facilities. It 
would then keep an inventory of approved sites for future devel-
opment, or develop the sites as they become approved. Through 
site planning, the state would avoid the risk of having industry 
relocate for lack of adequate waste disposal facilities, and would, 
thereby, protect its economy.3l5 
When the board is evaluating a particular site for approval, 
representatives from the host community would serve on the 
board, as is the practice in a majority of states having siting 
boards.3l6 These temporary representatives would provide assur-
ance for the host community that its concerns will be heard by the 
state. In order to maintain state control over the siting process, 
however, the number of ad hoc local representatives should con-
stitute less than a majority of the board. 
2. A local advisory/assesssment committee, composed solely of 
proposed host community representatives, should beformed by the 
chief official of that community. This board would 1) facilitate the 
exchange of information between the proposed host community 
and the state or facility developer, 2) provide a mechanism by 
which the host community may request and receive mitigation 
measures and incentives from the facility developer, and 3) pro-
vide a local perspective on the siting. 
To provide maximum local participation, the local committee 
should, like the Minnesota committee,317 inform the community of 
313. California provides the greatest example of a non-integrated approach to facility 
siting. See supra text and notes at notes 245-49. 
314. See supra text and notes at notes 140-49. 
315. See supra note 146. 
316. See supra notes 139 and 151. 
317. See supra text and note at note 158. 
1984] HAZARDOUS WASTE FACILITY 801 
the proposal; solicit, record, and communicate local attitudes and 
concerns to the appropriate state agency; and act as an exchange 
forum between the community and the state siting board. It 
would additionally, like the committees of Connecticut and Mas-
sachusetts,318 engage in negotiations with the developer to agree 
upon specific measures to be taken by the facility developer to 
mitigate the concerns of the residents, and incentive payments to 
be provided by the developer to compensate the host community 
for the effects of the siting which are not addressed by the mitiga-
tion measures to be taken. By incorporating these agreements 
into a contract which is binding upon both the host community 
and the facility developer, as is done in Massachusetts,319 a local 
community should feel protected by the developer's legal respon-
sibility to comply with the agreement. Consequently, the commu-
nity should feel that it had an effective voice in the siting process. 
3. Grants should be made available to the local advisory/ 
assessment committee of the host community for the purpose of 
funding an investigation of the proposed facility developer and 
evaluating the site application. Since the expense of this review 
could be substantial, technical assistance grants, like those avail-
able in Connecticut, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Maine and New 
Jersey,320 could alleviate the financial strain of such a process and, 
thereby, help to eliminate local opposition. 
Earmarked for employing staff, paying administrative ex-
penses, and contracting with qualified consultants, the grant 
could be financed by the facility applicant. The state could justify 
placing the financial burden on the applicant as a reasonable cost 
of doing business in the state. The funds would be paid to the state 
siting board, which in turn would distribute them to the host 
community. This method of collection and disbursement would 
provide a mechanism by which the necessary funds could be 
accounted for by an impartial body. 
As provided by the New Jersey statute,321 the results of the local 
community's review of the facility operator should be transmitted 
to the state siting authority. In that way, the state review would 
be expanded to include an evaluation of the proposal from the 
318. See supra text and notes at notes 156-57. 
319. See supra text and note at note 163. 
320. See supra text and notes at notes 168-69. 
321. See supra text and note at note 179. 
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perspective of the host community, and would give the commu-
nity a sense of greater participation in the siting process. 
4. Throughout the siting process the state siting board should 
schedule briefing sessions for the proposed host community. The 
briefing sessions should be designed to 1) outline the siting pro-
cess for the general public, 2) allow the facility developer an 
opportunity to describe the proposed facility in detail, 3) report on 
the progress of the evaluation of the proposal, and 4) provide a 
reasonable opportunity for those present to comment and ask 
questions. 
Maximum community participation in the briefing sessions 
should be encouraged. Massachusetts, which has adopted the 
most thorough scheme for publicizing the sessions,322 requires that 
a schedule of the sessions be sent, along with the notice of receipt 
of a site proposal, to the chief officials of all state cities and towns, 
and to newspapers that would reach that portion of the public 
"most likely to be affected." Although most sessions would be 
broad in scope and might provide little more than a forum for 
expounding positions for and against the proposed site, they 
would offer all interested and concerned residents an opportunity 
to participate in the siting process. 
5. Negotiations between the proposed facility developer and the 
local advisory assessment committee should be required. The 
negotiations should establish the measures to be taken by the 
developer to mitigate local concerns, and the incentive payments 
to be provided to the host community· as compensation for those 
concerns which are not addressed by mitigation measures. 
As provided by the statutes of Connecticut and Massachu-
setts,323 these negotiations should include discussions of the facili-
ty's design, operation, and management. Modifications and other 
methods of mitigating community concerns should be considered, 
and negotiations would then address how best to compensate the 
community for those concerns which remain. 
Since a facility may become more acceptable to a host commu-
nity if the community's concerns are addressed through either 
compensation or mitigation, these negotiations could play a key 
role in gaining community cooperation. The statute, however, 
should provide that conflicts be resolved by the state siting 
322. See 8upra text and note at note 142. 
323. See 8upra text and notes at notes 233-39. 
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board.324 The decisions of the arbitrator, along with all agreements 
reached in negotiations, should be entered into a final and binding 
contract. By incorporating the agreements into a binding con-
tract, as is done in Massachusetts,325 the host community would be 
assured of receiving either the mitigation measures and incen-
tives agreed upon, or satisfaction through legal recourse should 
the developer breach the contract. 
The survey of siting provisions contained in this section is 
intended to provide states enacting or amending siting statutes 
with an introduction to the types of provisions they should con-
sider, including provisions for increasing community participation 
in the siting process, and for eliminating local veto power over 
siting decisions. Whether community opposition is actually de-
creased by greater local participation in siting decisions can be 
determined only after sufficient time has passed to measure the 
success of the statutes now in place.326 It would appear to be in the 
interest of a state, however, to try to obtain a community's coop-
eration in siting a facility rather than forcing one upon it through 
the exercise of the state's preemption or eminent domain au-
thorities. It is for that reason, as well as considerations of the 
324. See, e.g., 1981 Conn. Pub. Acts 81-369. 
325. See supra note 237. 
326. The possibility of successfully siting a hazardous waste facility under the Massa-
chusetts siting statute recently came into question. McNiff, IT Drops Hazardous Waste 
Plan; Opponents of Warren Site 'Elated,' The Evening Gazette, June 14,1984, at 1, col. 4; 
Radin, IT Drops Plan for Waste Plant, Boston Globe, June 15, 1984, at 1, col. 1. 
IT, a California based company, had been trying since June, 1981 to site a $50 million 
chemical waste treatment plant in Warren, Massachusetts. John Schofield, senior vice 
president of IT, said that IT Corp. "would probably be required to invest up to $5 million 
to complete the mandated studies and obtain the required permits .... " McNiff, at 1, col. 2. 
" ... No company could expect to proceed with an investment of this obvious magnitude .. 
. and substantiate this as a prudent business decision." Radin, at 1, col. 2. 
Schofield characterized as impossible the requirements that the company 1) study all 
known or suspected health effects of any chemical which may be brought to the facility 
and 2) establish monitoring systems to determine the accuracy of those studies. He noted 
that the reason for the inability to meet the requirements was the disagreement among 
scientists of the health effects of even the most widely known hazardous chemicals. Had 
IT proceeded as the state officials had suggested, on the basis that they had made the 
best possible study effort, IT felt sure that the matter would be challenged in court, with 
only a fifty percent chance of the company's winning. 
A public member of the siting council, James Rogers, agrees with Schofield's assess-
ment of the difficulties inherent in the Massachusetts siting process. Rogers stated that 
the health and safety assessments required by current regulations had proven "even 
more difficult" than foreseen when formulated, and "may be impossible." Radin, at 9, col. 
3. 
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interests of the host community, that both types of siting provi-
sions -cooptation and preemption-are offered here. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The advances made in the area of chemical technology have 
contributed substantially to the improvement of our standard of 
living. We have consequently learned to depend upon man-made 
chemicals for our health, livelihood, housing, entertainment, 
transportation and food. Dependence has let to widespread accep-
tance, which in turn has led to increased production of chemicals 
and their hazardous by-products. If they are improperly man-
aged, these by-products pose so serious a threat to our nation's 
public health and environment that they are considered the 
major threat to health in the United States. 
In order to counter this threat, the federal government formu-
lated RCRA management regulations to track haz,ardous wastes 
from generation to disposal. If the tracking system is to succeed, 
there must be an adequate number of disposal facilities to match 
the waste generated by the country. Despite the fact that 
facilities are vital to the success of the federal plan, RCRA is silent 
on siting. It has left the states to formulate and modify their own 
individual procedures for choosing facility locations. 
The task of formulating these procedures is complicated by 
strong public opposition. The role of the states is, consequently, to 
provide state siting mechanisms to neutralize the opposition and 
override any locally legislated obstacles. This article has provided 
an overview of state siting provisions intended to accomplish 
these two goals. 
